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WHAT WAS THE "SOCIAL REVOLUTION OF 1946" IN EAST SUMATRA?
H. Mohammed Said*
Translated by Benedict Anderson and Toenggoel Siagian**
When foreign scholars anxious to deepen their understanding of 
the history of the Indonesian Revolution came to me in Medan while 
collecting data for their theses or other research projects, they 
usually asked me what I knew about the "social revolution" in East 
Sumatra. To most such questions I give no answers since I was not 
directly or even indirectly involved in that event. In mid-February 
1946 I was sent on a mission to Djakarta, traveling overland through 
Bukittinggi and Prabumulih. Only in June did I return to Medan.
When I arrived in Djakarta in the middle of March, after about a 
month on the road, I learned that the so-called "social revolution" 
had broken out. In fact the first I heard of it was from Prime Minis­
ter Sutan Sjahrir when he received me. Right off, before I could even 
sit down, he began questioning me as if I were a prime mover in it.
Quite frankly, I stared at him dumbfounded. Someone here in Dja­
karta knew what was happening in my own backyard even before I did. 
Sjahrir was then launching his diplomatic offensive to prove that 
"everything is running well" in Indonesia. So he was upset and dis­
appointed!
In fact, however, we should not be surprised that an event of 
this kind took place in East Sumatra or in any other area in which the 
Dutch rule was extended through a system of autonomous domains, sul­
tanates, principalities or whatever name was ever given to the struc­
ture of inlandse bestuur [native rule] or indirect bestuur [indirect 
rule]. Turned into "chisels" by the Dutch, and thereby developing
* H. Mohammed Said is a historian. His best known works are Atjeh Sepandjang Abad 
and Si Singamangaradja; among his other books the main one is 40 Hari Pendudukan 
Inggeris. In 1947 he set up the daily Waspada in Medan after being actively in­
volved with other newspapers before that date. In the 1950*s he was active in 
the PNI (and was once General Chairman for North Sumatra) and also in the PWI 
(Indonesian Journalists* Union).
** Translators* note: The original Indonesian text of this article appeared seri­
ally in the Djakarta newspaper Merdeka in February and March, 1972. Some minor 
liberties have been taken with the translation to make for smoother reading in 
English. The original text is liberally sprinkled with Dutch and English words, 
in a manner very typical of educated men of the author*s generation. In the case 
of Dutch words, they have been left in the text with a translation in brackets, 
to give more of the liavor of the writing. In addition, some explanatory foot­
notes have been added by the translators where it seemed they might assist the 
non-specialist reader.
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vested interests1 of their own, these rulers were separated from the 
people by a wide gulf. It would have been very strange if the rulers 
had been pleased with a 180 degree turnabout in political relations, 
and if the people had had confidence in their goodwill and sincerity.
Naturally there were some exceptions, places where such a wide 
gulf between ruler and ruled had no serious consequences. But even 
there it was a matter of degree! Atjeh, for example, a region with a 
rich history of resistance to Dutch colonialism, was one such excep­
tion, with the result that the f,Tjumbok Affair” or the ’’People’s Revo­
lution of December ’45” was confined to selected targets. It is gen­
erally known that many of the rulers there understood that they were 
rulers to serve not the Dutch but the people. Nonetheless, the fact 
that the notable figure of Teuku Nja* Arif, Republican Resident of 
Atjeh, had to be exiled to Takeungon and died there, as did Tengku 
Radja Sulung, ruler of Kuala Simpang, the first man to lead the rais­
ing of the Red and White flag in his area, and to merge his region 
into the territory of the Republic by swearing loyalty to her, seems 
to show that excesses could not be avoided.2
In Tapanuli there were also leaders with the title of radja, and 
even patuan, corresponding to the title of dipertuan in East Sumatra. 
Here, however, the Dutch had already instituted direct rule (rechts- 
streeks bestuursgebied) before they understood that the ’’autonomous 
rule” structure, as effected in East Sumatra and Atjeh, could more 
efficiently achieve their main aims of divide and rule and colonial 
exploitation. Above all, Batak family law in Tapanuli, which demanded 
continuous harmony by virtue of the requirements of local adat (i.e., 
Dalihan Na Tolu), obliged all parties {radja, kahanggi , anak boru/mora) 3 
to support and complement each other. As a result the gulf (gap) that
1. The text has the English words ’’vested interest.” Here, and in many other 
places, the author somewhat anachronistically uses phrases which only became 
part of the Indonesian political vocabulary long after the events he describes. 
Djakarta and Medan slang are occasionally employed for literary effect,
2. Teuku Nja* Arif, sagi-chief of the XXVI Mukims near Kutaradja, was a leading 
member of the uleebalang, the Atjehnese ruling class. He was graduated from the 
OSVIA (Training School for Native Administrators), and later became the best- 
known Atjehnese leader of the pre-war era. He sat on the Volksraad until 1931. 
During the Japanese period, he became top adviser to the Japanese administration 
in Atjeh, serving for a time as guncho (controleur) of Kutaradja. When the Atjeh 
Residency Advisory Council was set up in November 1943, he was elected chairman; 
and when in May 1945 an All-Sumatran Advisory Council was appointed, he was 
chosen as one of its vice-chairmen. He was also honored by an invitation to 
visit Japan. In October 1945 he was named first Republican Resident of Atjeh, 
but fell from power during the ’’social revolution” of January 1946. He died of 
diabetes on April 6, 1946 while under detention in the remote hill-town of 
Takeungon. (See A. J. Piekaar, Atjeh en de oorlog met Japan [The Hague/Bandung: 
van Hoeve, 1949], pp. 11-12, 15, 194, 205, 214, 220-21, 244 and 250.) Tengku 
Radja Sulung was the uleebalang of Kedjuruan Muda near Kuala Simpang, Southeast 
Atjeh. He too was made guncho by the Japanese (for Kuala Simpang) and sat on the 
Atjeh Residency Advisory Council. Like Teuku Nja’ Arif he was regarded as a 
nationalist and was somewhat distrusted by the Dutch. (See ibid., pp. 53-54,
194 and 221.)
3. Radja--chief; kahanggi--members of collateral branches of a chiefly lineage; 
anak boru--wife-receiving group, in Batak adat; mora--wife-giving group.
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the Dutch wished to dig within so homogeneous a society could easily 
be closed by the development of adat, in a situation where indirect 
rule did not exist. But in East Sumatra, which for the most part was 
inhabited by native Batak (Karo, Simelungun, Hulu Asahan, etc.), the 
system of "autonomous rule" exalted the position of the rulers by 
various types of prerogatives, and drastically reduced the role of the 
Dalihan Na Tolu. And since in East Sumatra many of the radja were not 
legitimate heirs but were outsiders (newcomers) or traitors to their 
own kin, the gulf dug by the Dutch could never be filled in.
A "Flash Back"
Of a total of about 250 radja, great and small, developed by the 
Dutch outside Java, there were about 25 in East Sumatra. Their consti­
tutional and administrative position was the same in the eyes of the 
Dutch authorities, but in terms of protocol they were treated very 
differently. Thus there were some radja with the title of Sultan who 
could show off their enormous wealth a la Nizam of Hyderabad, derived 
from "royalties" on BPM concessions, such as Langkat, or from tobacco 
corporations, such as Deli. These sultans were honored and were free 
to hold elaborate celebrations and festivities to which they could in­
vite Dutch bigwigs and foreign consuls. On the other hand, there were 
radja with salaries of only a few hundred rupiah, who could only meet 
expenses from a side income derived from adat property. These rulers 
were treated by the Dutch as no better than secretaries: if even a
low-level Dutch official summoned one to his office, he would hurry to 
obey the summons.
For the people, however, it made no difference whether they were 
under a rich radja or a poor one, for all these radja were turned into 
"chisels" by the Dutch to squeeze everything they could out of the 
people's physical resources, particularly with respect to taxes and 
corvee labor. In areas directly under Dutch administration, not much 
in the way of taxes could be gleaned from the common people. But in 
the rulers1 areas, not even the lowliest person in the remotest jungle 
areas could elude the radja's eyes. In Dutch-administered areas corvee 
labor had long been abolished, while in the radja1s areas, on the con­
trary, it was rather intensively practiced. Worse still, corvee was 
of many types. There was corvee of an age-old customary type. There 
was corvee purely for the personal needs of the ruler. And, if it was 
considered necessary by the Dutch authorities, corvee duties could 
always be hatched by decree of the local ruler {zelfbestuurbesluit) 9 
for example the organization of the Saro system in Simelungun, which 
was felt as a pretty heavy burden by the people.
The burden of all this suffering was by no means wholly attributed 
by the people to Dutch oppression, since in the main they had to deal 
only with the radja. That the people often regarded the radja as their 
oppressor can be seen from the complaints they forwarded directly to 
the Dutch authorities. On their side, the Dutch handled these com­
plaints very seriously and with much compassion, not only to check on 
the real effects of the claws of colonialism, protected on the knees 
of the radja, but also to arouse a popular belief that arbitrary 
tyranny was the fault not of the Dutch but of the radja. It depended 
on the circumstances whether it was advantageous or not to ease the 
suffering of the people; it depended on the situation whether or not 
to sustain their pressure on the radja to continue as their "chisels."
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In the agricultural sector, from the very beginning of Dutch pene­
tration of East Sumatra in 1863, the radja had been destroying the in­
digenous cultivations which had long been established. Concession 
hunters (first Dutch, then later English, German, Belgian, Polish, 
Russian, American, even Japanese adventurers) were given the opportunity 
to make use of as many thousands of hectares as they wanted, virtually 
for free and with minimal conditions, to open up tobacco, coffee and 
pepper plantations. These "Santa Claus" clearance sales involved lands 
being worked by the people, without their consent and in total conflict 
with adat law. According to this law (primarily in Deli, inhabited 
mainly by Karo), the people's land could not be taken from them without 
their consent or that of the gemeenschap or village community involved.
In that period, some of the smaller ra^ja, with the titles of 
datu or kedjuruan, from the start strongly opposed the penetration of 
the Dutch and their investments. The territories of these little 
radja, mainly Sunggal, largely occupied by Karo people, were in the 
sphere of influence of the Sultanate of Deli. Although they thought 
of themselves as independent, yet the geographical position of Deli, 
dominating the seaboard and the harbor, made them oppose the Sultan of 
Deli's unilateral policy of permitting the Dutch to enter and selling 
off the people's land. Furthermore, from the political angle, they 
felt it was extremely dangerous to ignore the factor of Atjeh, which 
was then in conflict with the Dutch and claimed Deli and the rest of 
East Sumatra as part of Atjeh. On the economic side, free trade with 
Penang (a British colony) was regarded as more "desirable" and "favor­
able." But after some years, the Sultan came to share the profits ob­
tained from the concessions, and the problem of the people's land being 
grabbed by the concessionaires was ignored. The peasants, of whom 
there were large numbers, eventually chose the path of violence and 
under the leadership of three Datuks of Sunggal (Datuk Ketjil, Datuk 
Djalil, and Sulung Laut), whom they fully supported, they launched in 
1872 a bitter armed insurrection. Only after seven months of violence 
did the Dutch manage to put the insurrection down, but not before huge 
reinforcements had to be brought from Djakarta. This rebellion should 
be inscribed in the pages of our national history of resistance to 
Dutch colonialism, since it is based on historical facts. It has al­
ready been recorded in the report of a Dutch writer who was in the war, 
using information he received first hand, that the rebellion (the 
"Batak War") was to kick out the Dutch. *
The Effect of Huge Investments
The consequences of the war were pretty serious. Villages and 
fields were destroyed. The local people's economic activities were 
paralyzed, as is demonstrated by the fact that right after the resist­
ance was broken, no peasants went to their dry-rice fields any more. 
That year Deli was hit by famine, and many lives would have been lost 
nad not the ruler, on Jutch insistence, hurriedly produced from his 
own pocket a large sum to import rice from Penang. This is a histori­
cal fact! But this bitter experience did not induce the Dutch to hesi­
tate in constantly pressuring the Sultan to give Dutch investments 
priority and preference above all else. The edict of the ruler was 4
4. See "De Expeditie naar Deli," Indisch Militair Tijdschrift, No. 7 § 8 (1874), 
pp. 337-359.
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pronounced: the people were forbidden to grow tobacco because it had
been made a Dutch monopoly, even though tobacco was a source of the 
local people's livelihood along with rice and pepper (discussed by 
Prof. K. Pelzer of Yale University in connection with the endemic land- 
hunger in East Sumatra).
In the face of this oppression, the people evidently did not cease 
their anti-Dutch activity. Although threatened with destitution, they 
refused to offer their services as plantation labor (selling food, 
building materials, etc.), so that the Dutch were forced to make the 
decision not to employ a local work-force, but rather to bring one in 
from outside. In Malaya, the work-force of the tin mines was already 
largely Chinese. But the Dutch found a way to entice them to Deli by 
offering higher wages. When the British entrepreneurs understood that 
their best workers were being drawn away, their government banned fur­
ther movement, and so the Dutch took the initiative to bring in Chinese 
workers from Canton, Swatow, Amoy and elsewhere, without investigating 
in advance whether these singkehb were criminals or not. Within a 
short space of time, these Chinese newcomers flooded East Sumatra. 
Furthermore, in order to develop a work-force for tasks which it was 
in their interests to have done by native Indonesians, the Dutch ob­
tained extraordinary facilities to bring in transmigrants from Java by 
the system of werving [recruitment] and of the "coolie contract." In 
addition, with the cooperation of the Sultan, the Dutch opened the way 
for anyone to enter the area who was looking for a bite to eat or a 
chance to get ahead. Automatically, this meant a basic change in 
social structure from a homogeneous society where harmony prevailed 
among its Malay and Karo elements, to a quite heterogeneous society in 
which these people, now a minority, were overwhelmed by the tide of 
newcomers from outside (Minangkabau, Tapanuli, Atjeh, Java, Sunda, 
Bojan, Sulawesi, Malukus, Bandjar, etc.) who competed with one another 
and sought their fortunes in an area which suddenly became known well- 
known as The Dollar Country--Deli; this not counting the influx of 
Keling (Indians) and people from other parts of Asia, indeed also Euro­
peans and Japanese who were energetic and acquired a privileged posi­
tion.
While Dutch colonialism brought the inhabitants, mingled with 
huge numbers of immigrants, into a single sphere, it also made use of 
methods it found appropriate to perpetuate its power, including con­
spicuous class stratification and discrimination.
Immigrants living in a ruler's territory were considered his sub­
jects and were subordinated to the ruler's jurisdiction with all the 
claws of the unwritten royal adat. Since they came with their own 
various native adat, naturally there was never any unity of perspec­
tive among the subjects except in regard to the negative aspects of 
the ruler. At the same time local inhabitants who became Dutch offi­
cials, even though local sons, were put under Dutch jurisdiction, and 
so, since they were freed from the toils of adat, their attitude to 
their own radja at the very least became freer by comparison with that 
of the indigenous population still within the ruler's legal control.
Accordingly, the prestige and authority of the radja varied from 
great to small, in the people's eyes, depending on the local situation 
and conditions. But it was clear that over the years the position of
5. Singkeh--pure-blooded, China-born Chinese.
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the rulers in the people1s eyes as a whole declined. By the end they 
were often branded as indolent big shots who only knew how to have a 
good time, and moreover as only being able to enjoy this life thanks 
to the protection of the Dutch--but not forever!
When the nationalist movement penetrated to East Sumatra, and 
various leaders went down into society and also analyzed various 
Sospolek6 7 problems in the press and in public meetings, they found the 
institution of the autonomous territory a severe impediment. In 1915 
they demanded that adat law be abolished or if not, at least be codi­
fied. This did not mean that they wanted to destroy the rulers in 
order to strengthen Dutch authority, but rather that the pressure 
exerted by these intermediaries hampered the development of harmony 
between ethnic groups and also aroused antipathy against the ruler on 
the part of his own people who were now no longer sovereign.
But the Dutch themselves, of course, wanted these conflicts to 
exist; and to defend their divide and rule tactics it was easy for 
them to say that they had no authority to change or abolish adat law, 
indeed that it was not the aim of colonialism to introduce Western 
ways of life.
Impediments to freedom of movement and assembly were very much 
felt in the rulers1 domains. There was a kind of ’’floating mass117 in 
the territories of the radja of East Sumatra and Atjeh (which indeed 
formed about 99% of the whole territory), since any kind of right to 
oppose the radja was unknown. Since adat law itself was unwritten, it 
was a simple matter to formulate and produce a completely semau gee8 
type of legal code including provisions aimed at obstructing the people 
or anyone else from carrying on political activities (naturally after 
being told to ’’hatch” it by some assistant resident or controleur).
On the basis of this adat, even closed meetings could easily be banned 
or broken up, and leaders who wished to visit the villages could easily 
be forbidden to do so or be ousted from the area, without the need of 
any regulation such as passenstelsel [pass-laws].
Prologue
The British were at their wits’ end when, in the middle of August 
1945, the Japanese suddenly surrendered and Indonesia proclaimed her 
independence. To prevent the development of what they called a ’’vacu­
um,” the British assigned to their own enemies, the Japanese, the re­
sponsibility for ensuring security inIndonesia and sternly forbade 
them to help the establishment of the Republic.
At the end of August, the two Sumatran representatives attending 
the session of the Committee for the Preparation of the Independence
6. Sospolek--an acronym of sosial-politik-ekonomi much in use in official circles 
since the early 1960's.
7. The English phrase "floating mass” seems to have been coined in the aftermath of 
the 1971 general elections. It meant that the ordinary Indonesian villagers 
would be preserved by the authorities from political party propaganda and agita­
tion.
8. Contemporary Djakarta slang for "arbitrary.”
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of the Republic of Indonesia, Teuku Mr. Mohd. Hassan and Dr. Amir, 
returned to Medan, forthwith to carry out their new functions as Gov­
ernor of Sumatra, and Minister of State without portfolio (permitted 
to reside in East Sumatra to work alongside the Governor).9 Top 
priority: giving substance to independence.
Yet the Proclamation, which should have been broadcast far and 
wide at once, was kept folded up in the pockets of these notables (or 
at best was not publicized openly) for more than a month. Giving sub­
stance to independence amounted perhaps only to maintaining telegraphic 
contact between the Governor and Indonesian officials and notables in 
the regions and cities, which could easily be handled by the Posts, 
Telephone and Telegraph service.
It was only on September 30, at a rather heated pemuda (militant 
youth) meeting at Djl. Ampelas, Medan, that Governor Hassan (under 
duress?) declared that as a matter of fact Indonesia was already inde­
pendent. Dr. Amir was not present. How meager and limited the activ­
ity of these high officials was can be seen from the fact that the 
Governor maintained his office in his own home. The office later used 
for this purpose was the former Balai Permohonan Rakjat [Hall of 
People's Appeals] in the Japanese time, now turned over thanks to the 
good graces of Mangaradja Soangkupon,10 the Balai's chief, the only 
official of that period who did not have a Japanese at his side.
From these developments it can be seen that the Japanese punctili­
ously obeyed British orders not to give any help whatever to the Indo­
nesians .
During the month and a half of what was termed a "vacuum," Nica11 
agents, as part of the Allied military forces, carried on their activi­
ties in various parts of Indonesia, including East Sumatra and Atjeh.
9. The Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia was established on August 7, 1945 
by the Japanese as the final stage in preparing for (nominal) Indonesian inde­
pendence. The twenty-one-member body contained three representatives for Suma­
tra, the two men listed above and Mr. Abdul Abbas. Mr. Teuku Muhammad Hassan 
was born in Sigli in 1906, to an uleebalang family. He received a law degree 
from Leiden University in 1933, and then entered the civil service. During the 
war he was a senior adviser to the Japanese Resident of East Sumatra with of­
fices in Medan. Dr. Mohammed Amir was born in Talawi, West Sumatra in 1900.
He obtained a medical degree in Holland in 1928. In 1937 he became personal 
physician to the Sultan of Langkat. During the Occupation, he was a member 
both of the East Sumatra Residency Advisory Council, and of the All-Sumatra 
Advisory Council. He died in 1949.
10. Abdul Firman gelar Mangaradja Soangkupon was born in 1885, to an upper-class 
family in Sipirok, Tapanuli. He was among the best-known Batak leaders of his 
generation. He had a long civil service career in East Sumatra and Tapanuli, 
and was elected to the Volksraad in 1927 as a member for East Sumatra and Riau. 
In 1931 he was elected to the Volksraad's "executive committee," the College 
van Gedelegeerden. In the Volksraad he was for ten years a member of Thamrin's 
National Fraction; in 1938 he was made chairman of the "Indonesian Nationalist 
Group" in that body. During the Occupation he was a senior adviser to the Japa­
nese Resident in Medan, and headed the body referred to in the text. He died
on February 16, 1946.
11. Nica--Netherlands Indies Civil Administration.
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Because of the changed situation (above all, the eruption of the Proc­
lamation) , these Nica agents openly undertook certain activities which 
were no longer limited to serving Allied interests, but were far more 
directed towards the Dutch colonial aim of destroying the newly estab­
lished Republic--making every possible use of the opportunity known as 
the "vacuum” to arouse fear, anxiety, chaos and even conflict among 
the Indonesians themselves. Thus as soon as the Gunseibucho (Japanese 
Governor) announced in Medan on August 22, that the Japanese had sur­
rendered, Dutch tacticians on missions "for" the Allies, under the 
cloak of the Red Cross or some other device, were swaggering around 
and getting very active. They set up headquarters in the Hotel de 
Boer and began to receive visitors. Their prime activity was: the
issue of collaboration. They gathered information [on the collabora­
tors], which could easily be obtained from (a) elements formerly loyal 
to the Dutch or glad to trade in gossip; (b) elements who nlost out" 
during the Japanese period; (c) those who hoped for positions and/or 
rewards under a Dutch "Restoration"; and (d) elements who were intimi­
dated or blackmailed into giving information, adventurers, etc.
At the start there arose a feeling of uncertainty and insecurity. 
There were indeed elements in society, even leaders, who were genuinely 
against Dutch colonialism and had been active in addressing public 
meetings or raising political consciousness among the people during 
the Japanese period, who now, because they were afraid of being branded 
as Japanese collaborators, immediately dropped out of sight. On the 
other hand, there were elements expecting to make a comeback, who wan­
dered all over the place at their ease because they had never been con­
spicuous during the Japanese period. There were also adventurers, 
criminals, recidivists and so forth who were fishing in troubled waters 
in their own characteristic way and by their own characteristic meth­
ods. All this, before the real mission of the Allies, the status of 
Nica and the people’s right to determine their own destiny were clear­
ly or widely known, seriously obstructed the creation of an atmosphere 
of calm and mutual understanding among the local populations.
At the beginning of October, British (Allied) troops landed in 
Sumatra and took up positions in Palembang, Padang and Medan. Troop 
shortages, however, severely limited the capacity of the British mili­
tary to accomplish their mission. In Atjeh, for example, the British 
were compelled to assign a Dutch officer, Major M. J. Knottenbelt from 
the intelligence unit ADCS (Force 136),12 with full authority as Allied 
military chief [pembesar] to enforce his will on the Japanese units 
stationed there in some strength--both to protect him as he proceeded 
to take actions he thought advantageous to his country’s interests, 
and to arouse conflicts and antagonists. He was there for quite a 
long time, from October 5 till November 10, on which day he was forced 
to take to his heels (it was no accident that this was the day the 
battle of Surabaja reached its climax). Dr. Piekaar’s account in 
Atjeh en de oorlog met Japan, though a Dutch version of events, gives 
a picture of how Knottenbelt succeeded in worsening the atmosphere 
there by his intrigues. Masubuchi, a high Japanese civilian adminis­
trator, who was very well known in Atjehnese circles, was compelled to 
take the desperate action of committing suicide (harakiri), although
12. ADCS--Anglo-Dutch Country Section--was a sub-unit of the well-known intelligence 
outfit Force 136, operating out of Colombo under Mountbatten. For some details, 
see Anthony Reid, "The Birth of the Republic in Sumatra," Indonesia, No. 12 
(October 1971), p. 32.
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the unfortunate man had discovered much that had been concealed from 
him.13 14
On October 6, the Governor of Sumatra officially announced the 
formation of the TKR, an armed unit designed to fill out the authority 
of the government of the Republic.11* As in the capital, so in the 
provinces: the pemuda who did not join the TKR channeled their vigi­
lance into bands which could more easily take to action and could 
operate more in accordance with the existing conditions and situation. 
This martial spirit, while basically an expression of a burning politi 
cal consciousness, was evidently also a response to the hostile atti­
tude taken by the Allied occupation forces themselves. Scarcely had 
he landed when the Allied Commander in Medan, [Brigadier-General]
T. E. D. Kelly, ordered all inhabitants, without exception, to surren­
der their arms. This was a blatantly hostile "decree." Incidents 
sparked either directly by his troops (the fighting in Brastagi) or 
indirectly by his agents (the Djalan Bali incident in Medan), and by 
Nica (the Siantar Hotel affair), were a stern warning to the pemuda/ 
resistance fighters to increase their vigilance and preparedness. The 
Allies took over or seized building after building, both those used by 
the government of the Republic and those used by pemuda ormas,15 par­
ticularly in cases where the Allies needed control over the building 
for strategic purposes or to weaken the growing capability of the 
Republican government.
While our pemuda/irregulars confined their preparations to defen­
sive actions alone, the enemy fabricated a kind of anarchy. Armed 
robbery, torture and kidnapping of civilians, especially Chinese, sud­
denly broke out, though it had been unknown before. The aim: dis­
crediting the purity and selflessness of the struggle. Investigation 
showed that the perpetrators were criminals evidently released from 
jail (by the British!) on purpose, among them a well-known "repeater," 
Amat Bojan. He was later encircled by our forces and shot in Brastagi
13. S. Masubuchi was evidently a remarkable man. According to Piekaar (Atjeh, p. 
191), he had been for many years a planter in East Sumatra and had acquired an 
outstanding knowledge of Indonesian society, and in particular of Atjeh.
Piekaar credits him with being the brains behind the F (Fujiwara)-Organization, 
a "fifth column" organized mainly among young Atjehnese traders in the last 
days of Dutch rule. During the Occupation he held successively the following 
functions: chief of police and personal secretary to the Japanese Resident of
Atjeh; head of the local information service and editor of the official news­
paper Atjeh Shimbun; chief of the key "general affairs" section of the local 
administration; and finally, as war conditions worsened, chief of the industry 
and communications section. Piekaar describes him as having "played the game of 
Atjehnese politics in masterly fashion" and adds that his popularity was so 
great that in certain Atjehnese circles he was referred to as bapak Atjeh 
(Father of Atjeh). According to Piekaar (Atjeh, p. 249), the Allied commander 
in Medan on October 21, 1945 ordered local Japanese military personnel to 
arrest Masubuchi (he was to be charged with war crimes), but the latter com­
mitted suicide to avoid this fate.
14. In Djakarta, on October 5, President Sukarno had proclaimed the formation of 
the Tentara Keamanan Rakjat (People's Security Army), to replace the more 
police-style Badan Keamanan Rakjat (People's Security Organization).
15. Ormas--organisasi massa (mass organizations)--an acronym coined and popularized 
only in the 1950's.
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Nonetheless, when this type of banditry had been successfully sup­
pressed, T. E. D. Kelly had another card up his sleeve. He armed Chi­
nese youths and formed a private army, the Poh An Tui,16 and played it 
off against us, a dirty tactic which can only spring from a dirty char­
acter. (As was later proved in court, the leaders of the Poh An Tui 
were robbers of the people's property and arsonists of the homes of 
ordinary Indonesian civilians, many of which were destroyed by their 
criminal activities.)
We may here record an incident which may have happened purely by 
chance, but which nonetheless should not escape attention. Several 
days after the Allies landed, the old Sultan of Deli died after a long 
illness.17 At this point neither the ruler nor his realm had expressed 
support for the Republic, in part because of their stand that Holland 
was the de jure owner of Indonesia, whose rights could not be over­
thrown just like that. By the terms of the "political contract" be­
tween the Dutch and Deli, the Dutch assumed responsibility for protect­
ing the Sultan in his status and authority. This provision represented 
a major element in the Sultan's interest, counterbalanced by the sub­
traction of almost all the Sultan's rights and powers as a sovereign, 
including the designation of a successor, who had to be agreed to by 
the Dutch. The presence of a high Dutch official was a conditio sine 
qua non for every inauguration of a new Sultan.
So it happened on that disastrous day, when the new Sultan had to 
be announced--since "the king is dead, long live the king."18 In the 
official ceremonial hall where the court officials of Deli were 
gathered to call upon and anoint Tengku Mahkota Otteman (subsequently 
known as Sultan Osman Sani) as the new sultan, a high Dutch official 
was present. Also present was a British major, an event which could 
be interpreted as a move to strengthen the "legality" of the Dutch 
position in the Allied occupation phase. Automatically, such occur­
rences represented a stance denying the Republic's rights and sover­
eignty in Deli, or a demonstration of the Allies involving themselves 
in local affairs--something which they were forbidden to do.
Allied involvement in the affair of the Sultanate of Deli became 
even clearer when Allied commander T. E. D. Kelly subsequently protected 
the Sultan of Deli and the palace complex with a strong armed guard 
when the "social revolution" was at its height.
"Who's Who"
To get a rough picture of the atmosphere of the revolution in 
Deli, it may be useful to comment on the most prominent popular lead­
ers of the period. Since the Japanese period, local leaders resident
16. Poh An Tui (Hokkien for Mandarin Pao An Tui)— Security Protection Force. In 
many places it was set up at Chinese initiative to protect the Chinese communi­
ties from robbery and violence.
17. This was Amaludin Sani Perkasa Alamsjah, who ascended the throne in 1924. The 
heir apparent, Tengku Othman (or Otteman), had been a member of the All-Sumatra 
Advisory Council during the Occupation.
18. Radja meninggal, radja mengebumikan--literally, 'the king is dead, the (new) 
king buries him.'
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in Medan who were known to be active among the masses of the people, 
included:
1. Abdu'l Xarim (read: Abdul Karim) Ms:19 an activist in the
nationalist movement since the 1920Ts; lived in Langsa; involved in 
the PKI movement in 1926-1927; banished to Digul; brought back some 
years later; living in Medan with his relatives thereafter. Non-active 
in politics. Managed the small nAnekaM printing-press; published the 
popular weekly Penjebar. During the Japanese period, an old acquaint­
ance of his called Hayasaki, who in the Dutch period had been a busi­
nessman, was assigned to Medan with the post of Mayor (Sich5). Haya­
saki invited Karim to work with him, and made him head of the Informa­
tion Institute (Balai Penerangan). Karim followed political activity 
in Java closely, taking special note of the way in which Sukarno and 
Hatta forged the masses via anti-Allied orpol. 20 He succeeded in in­
spiring the sympathy of the Sunseibucho (Japanese Governor) Nakashima,21 
and not long afterwards, by means of the support of the Bunkaka (Cul­
tural Office = Information and Censorship Service), he formed the 
political organization known as BOMPA (Body for Supporting the Struggle 
of Asia).22 Taking advantage of this, he used every tour through the 
area to form branches and make contact with local leaders and notables. 
Although a Marxist-Leninist (and therefore naturally anti-Fascist),
Karim did not make the slightest mention of the sources of his thinking 
in his public speeches, but rather stressed the vanguard role played 
by the Japanese people, who by their position at the waist of the con­
tinent of Asia corresponded to the position of the British at the 
waist of Europe. With this fact Karim associated the superiority of 
the Japanese, who seemed destined to assume the role of leader of Asia 
(our elder brother, on the same level with us, primus interpares), and 
capable of destroying Allied imperialism, under whose umbrella the 
Dutch took shelter.
Of course, people with some basic political understanding had to 
laugh, half admiringly; for in such an atmosphere he could still
19. Abdul Karim M.S. was born in Langsa some time in the first decade of the century. 
He had virtually no secondary education. He was active in the Indische Partij, 
first in Lhof Seumawe (Atjeh) from 1918-20, and later as a member of the All- 
Sumatra executive. While holding several low-level administrative jobs, he took 
an active role in the Communist-controlled Sarikat Rakjat and in 1924 headed the 
local PKI branch in Langsa (concurrently acting as the PKI Central Committee1s 
commissioner for Sumatra). He was imprisoned on a number of occasions for his 
political activities. In 1927 he was exiled to Digul. He was released in 1928 
and returned to Medan, where he worked occasionally as journalist and editor.
In the Japanese period, he was briefly imprisoned in Tjimahi, but later was made 
an aide to the mayor of Medan, and became the head of BOMPA (see below). He was 
a member of the East Sumatra Advisory Council, and an observer attached to the 
All-Sumatra Advisory Council. He died in Medan in November 1960.
20. Orpol (organisasi politik)--another acronym from the late 1950*s.
21. Retired General Tetsuzd Nakashima was the Japanese Resident of East Sumatra.
The Japanese title chdkan is variously translated as Resident and Governor.
22. BOMPA (given as an acronym for Badan Oentoek Membantoe Pertahanan Asia--Body 
for Assisting the Defense of Asia) was an East Sumatran equivalent of the Putera 
on Java, though it was set up in November 1944, just as the Putera was dying.
For more details, see Reid, "The Birth," p. 24.
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stealthily achieve his aim of giving the masses some political aware­
ness, although from another perspective the masses could not possibly 
comprehend how the Japanese, who were so curel and greedy, and were 
increasingly incapable of preserving the people from starvation and 
sufferings caused by every kind of deprivation, could possibly liber­
ate our Indonesian motherland from Dutch imperialism.
Although he was a man well-known to the Japanese as a Marxist- 
Leninist, Karim evidently aroused no suspicion, although his friends-- 
including M. Ridjal--were beheaded for involvement in the underground. 
Karim once told me in passing how he succeeded in dispelling the suspi­
cions of the PID (the Dutch secret police) while maintaining continuing 
contact with the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Medan; and at the 
same time dispelled Japanese suspicions while maintaining contact with 
his old acquaintance, Bulat, chief detective of the Dutch secret p o ­
lice, who was deeply involved in smelling out the activities of any 
Japanese elements from the early 1930!s on. This he did without com­
promising the national interest--and indeed, leaving aside the politi­
cal philosophy he embraced, Karim was undoubtedly a real patriot.
Karim was an orator, an attractive speaker--like Sukarno he used 
language that was popular and easy for the masses to understand. He 
was strongly built, handsome, elegantly dressed with a necktie, and 
with personal manners rather unusual for a militant proletarian. If - 
anyone mentioned this to him, he would respond quite spontaneously 
that the aim of the colonized was M(au) S(enang) [wants to have an 
easy life].
2. Saleh Umar, a nationalist leader, was in the Dutch period suc­
cessively a leader of the PN I , Partindo and later Gerindo,23 As the 
son of an Islamic judge, born and raised in Brandan, he received a 
religious as well as a secular education. He was a writer (poet), and 
for a while published a small religious weekly, before becoming an 
active reporter for the Pelita Andalas, from there getting involved in 
the nationalist movement. A clever speaker, persuasive and skilled in 
politics--he was well up on theory, ideology, philosophy, etc., from 
studying on his own. In daily life he was not very outgoing; he was 
more at ease in his own small circle. During the Dutch period he was 
imprisoned. Had many children. For his own reasons he put two of his 
boys into Chinese schools from the primary level up--he never explained 
why he didn't send them to a national school--to the point that they 
graduated from a college in the CPR. Saleh1s life-style was very 
modest, he had no talent for earning money even though his family was 
very large. Aside from his salary he minimally covered his expenses 
with honoraria for writings published by his admirers; possibly, too, 
his basic needs were eked out by the activities of his loyal wife 
Zahara. He was a close comrade in arms of Jakub Siregar (see below). 
His activities encompassed the world of the theater; by the products 
of his involvement with creative artists organized in the Kinsei Geki- 
dan, the theater in East Sumatra, he can be said to have helped pioneer 
modernization. He was attached to the Bunkaka (Japanese Cultural 
Office); introduced as a nationalist politician, writer and poet, he 
became the No. 1 civil official in both politics and culture in that 
organization, about one year before the author joined this office 
(press and censorship division).
23. M. Saleh Umar was born in Pangkalan Brandan in 1909. He founded the Medan 
branch of Gerindo.
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3. Jakub Siregar was the son of a very well-known nationalist 
businessman, Sutan Martua Radja, owner of the ’’Indonesia Printing Co.,” 
who had once published the dailies Pantjaran Berita2 and Utusan Sumatra 
from about 1925 to 1935. Sutan Martua Radja had many sons who helped 
their father after they came of age. Not so, however, Jakub, who 
wanted to join the nationalist movement. Like Saleh Umar, Jakub Sire- 
gar was active in leading Partindo and later Gerindo, as well as work­
ing as a bush-lawyer. In this capacity he was often to be seen defend­
ing the poor. He was also very active as a leader, giving courses and 
attracting followers by educating them. On the eve of the Japanese 
invasion, he worked for their fifth column and became a leading ”F,"21* 
thereafter cooperating actively with the Japanese. Later it was 
rumored that he was charged with masterminding an anti-Japanese resist­
ance movement among Karo peasants, and he was arrested; but he was 
later released. After getting closely acquainted with the head of the 
Kempeitai [Japanese military police], Captain Inouye, a member of the 
Black Dragon Society specially assigned to the Sumatra front, Jakub 
cooperated closely with him, especially in training cadres among the 
fishermen and peasants, who might appropriately be made into a front 
line force to stem enemy infiltration.24 5 One organization that they 
formed and led in 1944 was called Ken Ko Ku Tui Sin Tai or, in Indone­
sian, Barisan Harimau Liar (Wild Tiger Corps).26
Jakub was rarely seen in public and did not mingle with other 
leaders during the Japanese period, but all of them knew about him.
His wife, a beautiful woman with a MULO education, called Chadidjah, 
was also a capable leader, successfully training female cadres among 
the common people.
4. The figure of Hamka is sufficiently well-known.27 During the 
Japanese period, he was close to the Gunseibucho, Gen. Nakashima, and
24. ”FM refers to the "fifth column" organized out of Malacca, the full title of 
which was Fujiwara-kikan, after its creator Major Iwaichi Fujiwara. About one 
hundred young Indonesians (mainly Atjehnese) were trained between the fall of 
Penang on December 19, 1941 and the Japanese landings on Sumatra. See Piekaar, 
Atjeh, pp. 77, 175-177; also George S. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of 
Indonesia: Prelude to Independence" (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1967), 
p. 256, n. 45. The trainees apparently wore armbands with the letter "F" for 
identification. Fujiwara soon turned over control to Masubuchi and went on to 
train cadres for Subhas Chandra Bose!s Indian Independence Army. An account of 
his experiences is given in his Dai Toa Senso ni Okeru Atjeh Minzoku Undo no 
Kaikoroku [An Account of the Atjeh Nationalist Movement in the Greater East 
Asia War] (Tokyo: [?], 1955).
25. Capt. Inouye seems in fact to have been head of the Keimubu (civil police de­
partment) of the military administration in Medan. "Black Dragon Society" was 
the name popularly given in the West to the Amur River Association (Kokuryu Kai) 
founded in 1901 by the well-known expansionist and ultra-nationalist Ryohei 
Uchida. See Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 291-92.
26. Evidently a misprint for Kenkoku Teisintai (approximately, National Guard).
The origin of the Indonesian name is unclear.
27. Hadji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (fHamkaf) was born in Manindjau, West Sumatra 
in 1908, son of the famous reformist ulama Abdul Karim Amrullah (?Hadji Rasul1). 
He made a big reputation in the Dutch period as a modernist Islamic publicist,
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often gave speeches in mass meetings on commemoration dates. In sup­
porting Japanese political strategy, Hamka was evidently shrewd enough 
not to make any reference to the verses of the Koran or the Hadith or 
the attitude of Islam towards Japan1s war aims and its consequences in 
terms of the suffering of the Indonesian people. Nonetheless, on occa­
sion his cleverness in this regard was excessively acrobatic, for exam­
ple when he spoke of the Prophet breaking his fast with only three 
dates. In spite of the fact that Hamka's popularity could not decline, 
even though he had worked actively with the Japanese, and his position 
in society was pretty strong, about a month after the Proclamation 
Hamka decided to move to Minangkabau. (A memoir he once wrote in the 
daily Waspada--Hamka is till now a good friend of the writer--who con­
tinues to admire him--described his experiences at the start of the 
revolution, including, as he told it, having his house stoned.)
5. The journalist Adinegoro was formerly editor of Pewarta Deli.28 
When this daily was closed during the Japanese period, he was assigned 
to handle the Indonesian edition of Sumatra Shimbun (later Kita Sumatora 
Shimbun) , whose size was limited to a handkerchief-sized page. Actual­
ly Adinegoro was a leader very little known in personal terms by 
society, but, on the other hand, was widely known from his writings. 
Aside from describing and analyzing current problems at home and 
abroad, he also offered much political guidance via the newspaper that 
he edited. Through the press he was able to form many cadres whom he 
did not know personally, but who gained their political consciousness 
thereby and implemented the patriotic struggle from the products of 
his newspaper advice.
During the Japanese period, he often wrote editorials in his 
paper, which, though they oratorically praised the Japanese and strong­
ly condemned the Allies, yet subtly but clearly conveyed another mes­
sage between the lines to his readers. As an official in the censor­
ship division of the Japanese Office of Culture, the writer felt this 
as others did, but for obvious reasons did not black them out.
When towards the end of 1944, a Sumatran parliament (Chuo Sangi-in) 
was formed, Adinegoro moved to Bukittinggi because he was appointed 
general secretary to that body.28 9 He was replaced by Jahja Jakub, a 
HBS graduate, who was for a time a teacher in a Muhammadijah school,
newspaper editor, and author. He was also a prominent member of Muhammadijah. 
During the Japanese Occupation, he was a member of both the East Sumatra Resi­
dency Advisory Council and the All-Sumatra Advisory Council.
28. Djamaludin Adinegoro was born in Sawahlunto, West Sumatra, in 1904, to an upper- 
class Minangkabau family. He had a good Dutch education and studied in Europe. 
On his return he made a successful career as a writer, journalist and newspaper 
editor. In the Japanese period, he sat on the East Sumatra Residency Advisory 
Council and on the All-Sumatra Advisory Council; he was also secretary of the 
Sumatran equivalent of the Badan Penjelidik (Investigatory Body), established
in July 1945, which made studies of preparations for independence. He was a 
half-brother of the well-known nationalist politician and author Mr. Muhammad 
Yamin.
29. The author uses the anachronistic DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat--People*s Repre­
sentative Assembly [parliament]) to describe the All-Sumatra Advisory Council 
(which actually only met once, on June 27, 1945).
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but after becoming an intimate of Karim Ms, was taken in by Marxism.30 
As a journalist, his analyses were close to those of Adinegoro; yet 
during the transition from the Japanese to the Republican periods, his 
newspaper, Kita Sumatora Shimbun, for a long time stayed stuck in its 
Japanese outlook, as indicated by the fact that it took a long while 
before the news of the Proclamation of Independence was printed in its 
pages.
6. Sugondo Kartoprodjo, a Taman Siswa leader, was well-known 
locally because his Taman Siswa school was part of the school system 
built up and enriched by the nationalist and patriot, Ki Hadjar Dewan- 
toro, as a nationalist fortress against colonialism.31 Sugondo had 
many former pupils who had gone back or down into society, so natural­
ly it was easy for him to gain a position as a popular leader. This 
has already been demonstrated in the Dutch era when he had once been 
successfully elected to the [Medan] Municipal Council. He was often 
to be seen taking part in popular meetings and rallies. But during 
the Japanese period he was assigned to be chief of the bureau of social 
welfare, and there suffered a decline in prestige because the Japanese, 
using the term "superfluous/useless men” (i.e., the unemployed), de­
manded the mobilization of such people for "voluntary” defense work 
(kinrohoshi) in Sabang, using his office as the channel for their 
propaganda. Nevertheless, Sugondo was not a failure as a leader, but 
rather, since he was not a taker of initiatives, he was felt to be a 
nationalist in speech rather than in giving actual leadership.
Beyond these men, one could hardly say there were national-caliber 
leaders who could be called real leaders of the people; but of course 
there were plenty of regional-caliber leaders.
With respect to leaders from the intelligentsia/elite, their 
prominence depended on their functional positions in the government: 
a good example was Teuku Mr. Hasan himself, who was appointed Governor 
of Sumatra by the Central Government of the Republic. Although he 
frequently appeared at meetings of Islamic organizations in the colo­
nial period, he never put himself on the front line, and at best could 
be classified as a "salon-leader. ” He had a law degree (in Islamology) , 
and became a referendaris in the office of the Governor in the Dutch 
period, the highest rank that could be attained by a "native" in those 
days. In the Japanese period he was made a senior advisory official, 
again the highest position open to an Indonesian at that time.
The most interesting thing about him was his conduct at work and 
in his private life. He was very simple and modest, not at all arro­
gant though he was the son of a radja (Teuku Bintara Pineung Brahim); 
he was basically non-political, but a faithful believer. Perhaps that 
was why he caught the government’s attention, though as Governor he 
should have been flexible, and ready to take decisive initiatives.
As for Dr. Amir, a brilliant psychiatrist without rival in his 
generation, his wife was a beautiful Dutchwoman, with two children.
30. Jahja Jakub was born in Labuhan Bilik, East Sumatra, in 1915. He was a well- 
known journalist in Medan before and during the war. He spent nine months in 
Sukamiskin prison in 1941 for violations of the colonial press laws. HBS--the 
elite Dutch-language high school of the later colonial period.
31. On the Taman Siswa schools, see Ruth T. McVey, "Taman Siswa and the Indonesian 
National Awakening," Indonesia, No. 4 (October 1967), pp. 128-149.
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When Amir worked as court doctor in Tandjungpura, it was evident that 
she was his inseparable companion and adviser. Amir was a nationalist, 
but one whose activity was evident only in the articles he wrote for 
magazines and newspapers. These writings not only analyzed the deca­
dence of colonialism but also urged a broad definition of nationalism, 
i.e., he opposed Java-centrism. Nonetheless Amir was only a success 
in his profession; he was a failure in the community, especially after 
he was made Minister of State without portfolio--an office he would 
not accept if it meant residing in Djakarta and abandoning the home in 
Tandjungpura that his wife loved so well.
Other leaders from the elite, such as Mr. Mohd. Jusuf and Mr.
Luat Siregar, both found their academic skills employed by the Japa­
nese mayor of Medan, as Nos. 2 and 3.32 Jusuf had been a trial lawyer 
since the 1930's. Although he did not get deeply involved in the 
nationalist movement like the leaders he succeeded (Mr. Iwa Kusuma 
Sumantri and Mr. Sunarjo), as a nationalist who never refused to take 
up the case of the poor and weak, Jusuf's position in the Indonesian 
community was much respected. As a political leader, however, nothing 
could be expected from him. Rather different from Mr. Luat Siregar, 
who was not very successful at his profession (most cases were monopo­
lized by Dutch lawyers) but was able to follow and adapt to patterns 
of social intercourse in the middle class and below. In the Dutch 
period he was a Parindrist, but was not very active, even though he 
belonged to the moderate group. Later on, after becoming acquainted 
with Abdul Karim Ms, he gained prominence as a Marxist leader at 
Karim's side, as was also the case with another Parindrist, S. M. 
Tarigan, who after working alongside Karim, became a Marxist and a 
Karimist (possibly best encapsulated by the term Marxist-Karimist).
Other leaders came from the religious groups, such as H. Abdul 
Rahman Sjihab, Udin Sjamsudin, Junan Nasution, etc., and such Christian 
leaders as M. Hutasoit and Melanchthon Siregar.33
Of course many other names should be recorded as playing leader­
ship roles in East Sumatra at that time. My intention is mentioning 
the above names is to point up the immediate post-Proclamation period. 
For had they or even one of them immediately stepped forward as the
32. Mr. Mohammed Jusuf was born in Magelang, Java, and obtained a law degree from 
Leiden University. He then went on to practice law in Medan. Mr. Luat Siregar 
was b o m  in Sipirok, Tapanuli, in 1908. He obtained a law degree from Leiden 
in 1934, and then went into practice in Medan. In the Japanese period he was a 
secretary to the Japanese mayor of Medan, and was active in BOMPA. (He died in 
1953.)
33. H. Abdul Rahman Sjihab, a Mandailing Batak, was a prominent Muhammadijah and 
later Masjumi leader in East Sumatra. Udin Sjamsudin, born in Medan in 1907, 
was active in the modernist Islamic movement. From 1932 to the middle 1950's 
he was secretary-general of the reformist social-educational association A1 
Djamiatul Washlijah. Junan Nasution, born in Kotanopan, S. Tapanuli, in 1914, 
had an Islamic education and was thereafter active in reformist Islamic politics, 
mainly as a journalist and editor. During the Occupation, he was head of the 
Muhammadijah in Medan. Mamicus Hutasoit was born in Siborongborong, N. Tapa­
nuli, in 1910. Prior to the war he was mainly active as a schoolteacher; during 
the Occupation he had an administrative position with the Medan authorities. 
Melanchthon Siregar was born in Pesarung Negeri Paranginan, N. Tapanuli, in 
1913. He too worked mainly as a schoolteacher until the end of the war.
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extension of the people’s tongue,34 openly or spontaneously transmit­
ting the news of independence and at the same time urging its realiza­
tion, the delay in the communication of this vital news would not have 
caused such great confusion in the people’s minds.
But there was one other leader who cropped up quite unexpectedly 
after the news of the Proclamation and the Allied landing got round. 
This was Junus Nasution, a former clerk in the British Fraser § Neave 
lemon-squash factory in Medan.35 I have no idea by what channel he 
became so prominent so suddenly. I had known him for a long time, 
from the colonial period, but just enough to nod politely to if we 
met; if we talked, it was just trivia. As a Mandailinger, his circle 
of acquaintances was probably confined largely to that group; yet it 
seems unlikely that it was from them that he climbed the ladder to 
take so prominent a part in the struggle to give content to the revo­
lution. I never heard that he had ever belonged to any political 
organization. Nonetheless, recalling that he was formerly a bosom 
friend of M. Djoni, the Fat Bison of Deli, who later became the gen­
eral chairman of the Red PKI in Jogjakarta on the eve of the transfer 
of sovereignty, at the very least he must have been a man who followed 
political developments closely.36
Before I went to Java in February 1946, his position was already 
very high--Assistant Resident, deploying directly the authority of 
Resident Tengku Hafas, pangrehprodja [high civil servant] and aristo­
crat from the Sultanate of Deli, who had been named Resident of the 
Republican Government by Governor Hassan. The writer was astounded 
when he returned several months later and went to inspect the prison 
camp at Raja, to find Junus Nasution held there along with other 
prisoners of the aristocratic group. So quickly did he rise, so 
quickly did he fall.
Notes and Data
As has already been mentioned, the two leaders Mr. Hassan and Dr. 
Amir returned from Djakarta towards th.e end of August, 1945. From 
subsequent inquiries, the writer learned that the two of them came to
34. The author here uses Sukarno’s self-bestowed title penjambung lidah rakjat.
35. M. Junus Nasution seems to have known Tan Malaka when the latter was teaching
in the Medan area after World War I,, and to have come under his influence.
36. M. Djoni was born in Kampung Gunung Manaan, Penjabungan, S. Tapanuli, in 1900.
As a child he was taken to Mecca, and went to school there. On his return he
had some minimal secondary secular education in Medan. While working with a 
Dutch private company in Atjeh, he became involved with the PKI and was barred 
from Atjeh as a result. From them on he was in and out of prison, in part for 
political reasons. In 1939 he was jailed for the last time by the Dutch and 
was subsequently deported to Digul. In 1943 he was moved to Merauke. He seems 
to have returned to Indonesia (Djakarta) in 1947. He became a colorful and 
evidently rather notorious figure in Jogjakarta during the later revolutionary 
period, and was imprisoned at least twice as a troublemaker (it was probably 
then that he acquired the soubriquet Banteng Gemuk [Fat Bison]). Though he 
seems to have known both Tan Malaka and Amir Sjarifuddin, he was very much a 
"single-fighter" and led his own fred! PKI as a private army.
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the fore because they were the choice of Sukarno and Hatta themselves, 
not of the Japanese. The change, which would restore Sumatra as an 
integral part of Indonesian territory (i.e., not according to the divi­
sion of Japanese military responsibility whereby Sumatra was part of 
the main base area of Singapore and was under the Gunseikanbu in Bukit- 
tinggi) and furthermore would make Medan its capital (in fact consist­
ent with the Dutch authorities' own [pre-war] plans for administrative 
reform) reflected the thinking that Medan leaders were needed to whom 
active top leadership could be entrusted. Medan had a variety of popu­
lar or community leaders, as sketched out above, but their administra­
tive skills were a matter of doubt, though they were admittedly more 
creative and full of initiative. There was no popular leader like Dr. 
A. K. Gani in Palembang who was a university graduate, or even like 
Sjafei in Minangkabau or even Teuku Nja' Arif, who had a [Dutch] high 
school education.37 Most of them, like Karim Ms., Saleh Umar or Jakub 
Siregar, were champion orators. While Mr. Mohd. Jusuf was known to be 
close to the people, he was an immigrant from Java, and thus did not 
have the key qualification of being a native son like Mr. Hassan or Dr. 
Amir. While Luat Siregar had a law degree, possibly his name wasn't 
yet well known in Djakarta. Furthermore, he was way behind such men 
as Karim Ms., Saleh Umar and Jakub Siregar as a popular leader. Thus 
it is not surprising that Djakarta's choice fell on Teuku Mr. Hassan 
and Dr. Amir. Nonetheless, as was subsequently demonstrated, the con­
sequence of their timidity was that the needed rapidity in giving con­
tent to the Proclamation was never achieved.
There is some evidence suggesting that Mr. Hassan was appointed 
Governor at the suggestion of Dr. Amir, the leader whom Hatta possibly 
had in mind at the start. Amir preferred to be Minister of State and 
proposed Hassan in his place, with results we shall see later on, since 
he sat at Hassan's right hand and controlled the sneVheid [speed of 
action] of the Governor.
There are also indications that Amir was not really serious about 
the Proclamation, since he believed that the Dutch would not simply 
give up and that the Allies would not be willing to help us. Accord­
ingly, he felt ambivalent, and "telepathized" his "psychoanalysis" to 
Hassan. Always at Hassan's elbow, he was able to influence him con­
siderably, doubtless thanks to his "scientific analyses."
It so happened that just after the two leaders returned from Dja­
karta, the writer was invited for the weekend to Dr. Amir's home in 
Tandjungpura, along with Karim Ms. and Jahja Jakub. We were told that 
Mr. Hassan and Dr. Amir would give us their analysis of what they had 
brought back, and would then formulate, or at the very least adumbrate, 
the "follow-up" they planned. But in fact all we did the whole night 
long was chat and gossip about trivia, the more easily since all of us
37. Dr. Adnan Kapau Gani was born near Bukittinggi, West Sumatra in 1905. He was 
graduated from the Djakarta Medical College in 1940. Aside from a career in 
films and the theater, he was a prominent young nationalist. He was a member 
of Partindo, and co-founder and first chairman of Gerindo. He was imprisoned 
by the Japanese in Palembang. He was later released, and even made a member of 
the local Residency Advisory Council and the All-Sumatra Advisory Council. 
Mohammed Sjafe'i was born in 1895 or 1896. He became famous primarily for 
founding a pioneering experimental nationalist school at Kajutanam, West Sumatra. 
During the Occupation, he was chairman of the West Sumatra Residency Advisory 
Council and the All-Sumatra Advisory Council.
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were good joke-tellers and raconteurs. But they were silent whenever 
the slightest serious question was raised about their impressions from 
Djakarta and the "follow-up” they had in mind. This in spite of the 
fact that they would have lost nothing if they had revealed to the 
writer that the Proclamation had been sparked and the text read, and 
the writer had then broadcast it widely. Wouldn’t it actually then 
have spread rapidly throughout the community?
As a shrewd and quick-thinking man--as the saying goes, the mirror 
is quick to the face, the axe is quick to the foot--Karim Ms. had begun 
to cultivate these two leaders from the moment they stepped into the 
limelight in the last month of the Japanese Occupation, especially 
Teuku Hassan, who was more easily approached, since both were immi­
grants from Atjeh. There is convincing evidence that Karim had already 
learned about the fact and the text of the Proclamation privately from 
Teuku Hassan. If this is so, then Karim’s silence and failure to 
broadcast the news of the Proclamation on his own must be regarded as 
a failure of responsibility as a leader of the people. This indeed 
was Karim’s weakness. At that point the writer decided to take steps 
on his own, to find a financier willing to publish a daily newspaper, 
in which the writer would assume full responsibility, particularly 
vis-a-vis the authorities--for the newspaper would be published inde­
pendently, without license from the government. But because of the 
many problems involved, it was only on September 29 that this paper, 
the Pewarta Deli, could appear for the first time.
In the meantime, the popular leaders mentioned above were active/ 
inactive more or less as follows. While Karim himself seemed still to 
sit with his hands in his lap, his son Nip Karim, a pemuda who shared 
none of his father’s taste for speeches, formed an armed unit, and, as 
later became well known, played an important role in the Medan area, 
with his headquarters in the Two Rivers plantation near Deli Tua. 
Possibly all that he got was his father’s blessing, but the son’s 
forces were strengthened with the addition of deserting Japanese and 
KNIL officers, and looked convincing enough to rely upon.38
It was very clear that, in a period when news of the Proclamation 
was still obscure, there was a great need for prominent leaders to pro­
vide information and guidance, at the very least to prevent panic, 
misunderstanding and deliberate distortion for the purpose of creating 
confusion and error. In Djakarta the newspaper Asia Raya courageously 
continued publication and was successful in using its pages to spread 
the news of independence. In Medan, on the other hand, the Kita 
Sumatora Shimbun, under Jahja Jakub’s leadership, published no reports 
of independence, and continued to take its proof copy to the censor 
for checking, even though the writer himself, who, as a member of the 
censorship staff had long been accustomed to the daily passing and 
stamping of copy coming in, had quit on August 22, the day that the 
Japanese Governor announced the Japanese surrender. Since the Kita 
Sumatora Shimbun continued to hand in proof-copy, the man who replaced 
the writer, Azis Latif, without having authority transferred to him, 
continued with the censorship until the end of September, even though 
all the Domei news by then was completely empty.39
38. KNIL--Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands Indies Army)-- 
was the Dutch colonial army.
39. Domei was the Japanese wartime news-agency.
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As for Saleh Umar and Jakub Siregar, the word was that the moment 
they heard the explicit announcement that the Japanese had surrendered, 
they hurriedly left for the south. They were lucky enough to run into 
Dr. Gani in Palembang, and from him they got a clear picture of the 
Proclamation and the need to give it content. Saleh Umar returned at 
once to Medan to carry on work among the people. But Jakub Siregar, 
together with his wife and Mansur, a loyal "aide," continued his trav­
els and crossed over to Java. For some months he took a holiday in 
West Java (this was what Mansur told me when I met him in the Hotel 
Merdeka in Jogjakarta, describing his disillusionment).
So it was that at that time, and especially in Medan, there was 
an unsettled atmosphere which permitted the growth of all kinds of con­
fusion. For example, towards the end of August 1945, there was a 
broadsheet circulated, signed by members of the functional elite (in­
cluding the radja) urging the people to stay calm and orderly. It was 
clear enough that this broadsheet was meant quite sincerely and inno­
cently but in fact it aroused great suspicion because its signers were 
for the most part from aristocratic circles, whose attitude towards 
the Proclamation was rather dubious. It is true that among the signa­
tures there were two or three popular leaders, but precisely that 
created the impression that they were being used as a shield. It is a 
pity that the writer did not save a copy of this broadsheet for archiv­
al purposes. It would be a good starting point for a study of the 
development of the "social revolution" in East Sumatra with all its 
good and bad effects.
The atmosphere continued to change, and finally, since there was 
no word of initiatives on the part of the older leaders (functional 
and non-functional), the pemuda names came increasingly to be heard on 
people's lips. Among them was Sarwono Sastrosutardjo, a former teacher 
in the Taman Siswa school-system. It was he who later became the 
leader of Pesindo in East Sumatra.1,0 Although he was considered a 
pemuda, actually he was already married. A friend of his, Zainal 
Baharuddin. was also active as the organization's general secretary.1*1 
Later developments showed that Sarwono frequently met with Karim Ms., 
and became a Karimist. One gets this impression from the fact that 
Karim succeeded in having Sarwono made a member of the National Parlia­
ment as a member of the Sumatra PKI's quota.1*2
After Governor Hassan's announcement in Dj1. Ampelas, the revolu­
tionary atmosphere became rather more clear, especially after the land­
ing of the Allied troops. Karim Ms. was no longer silent and passive. 
He paid continual attention to the writer when the latter was actively 
directing the independent newspaper Pewarta Deli (which was published 
without official permit) after September 29. One day he came to show 4012
40. Pesindo--Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Socialist Youth of Indonesia). It had no 
organizational or even clear ideological ties with the Pesindo which developed 
in Java at about the same time.
41. Zainal Baharuddin was born in Kutaradja in 1908. He trained as a schoolteacher 
and in the last years of Dutch rule taught in a Muhammadijah school in Kuala 
Simpang. At the end of the Occupation he was teaching in a high school in Medan.
42. Sumatra was allotted a quota of seats in the Central National Indonesian Commit­
tee (KNIP), the national parliament of the period. Evidently the local PKI was 
assigned a segment of this quota.
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a telegram from Sukarno ordering him to form and lead a single party, 
the PNI, for all Sumatra. But several days later he annulled this 
possibility himself; for Saleh Umar, who had just returned from Palem- 
bang, had evidently been given a mandate for this purpose by Dr. A. 
Gani, whom Sukarno had assigned to build up this party in Sumatra.
Not long afterwards, Karim came to see me and told me that he was going 
to set up a PKI in Medan, and had already sent a cable to Mr. Moh. 
Jusuph, the founder of the first PKI after independence was proclaimed, 
which had its headquarters in Tjirebon.1*3 The writer made no response 
to this, and Karim himself made no overtures; he knew that the writer 
was not a man who could be attracted to Communism or turned into a 
Communist, since by temperament, style of thinking and character, as 
well as by ideals, he was not a man prone to jump hither and thither 
in the dark.
It appeared that Karim himself was no longer passive and silent, 
but made strenuous efforts to be constantly at the Governor's side.
His official function was still unknown when he was able to gain much 
influence from this close association, but later he was able to get 
appointed as Resident seconded to the Governor's office. In the mean­
time, the question of who was friend and who was foe (enemy, collabo­
rator, etc.) was becoming very important, since arms were falling into 
the hands of different groups. When the Japanese began to feel sure 
that the British would not be able to move outside the capital city 
(indicated by the fact that the British were willing to request the 
help of the Republic in releasing prisoners of war and disarming the 
Japanese, and indeed ordered the Japanese military to hand over super­
vision of the BPM oil-wells at Pangkalan Brandan to the Republic), they 
understood that the question of providing an inventarization of the 
weapons and vital stocks in their possession, which the British re­
quired, would be no more than a formality.
But in fact the Japanese knew very little about the growth of the 
Republic, its administrative apparatus and the official holders of 
authority. Indeed on one occasion their obedience to British orders 
was so abolute and cruel (sadis) that they caused the December 13 mas­
sacre in Tebing Tinggi, simply to demonstrate to the British that they 
were not in collusion with the Indonesians, in so far as weapons passed 
into the hands of our pemuda and irregulars. On the other hand their 
stupidity was so great that they believed that those who were entitled 
to receive the weapons they handed over (by either ruse or bribe) were 
only those who had mingled with and cooperated with them. Most of 
them had no idea who were the real patriots and freedom-fighters, so 
that only too many weapons fell into the wrong hands (adventurers), or 
into the hands of sultans, radja,.or uleebalang, whose political con­
sciousness and sincerity of intention were scarcely convincing. This 
occurred, for example, in Asahan, where the local Japanese officer 
transferred some weapons to the Sultan, whom some people say the Japa­
nese regarded as the functional Republican authority of the Republic.
As a result, each group or unit was increasingly anxious to ob­
tain fighting strength (i.e., arms), as was evidenced by the way the 43
43. Mr. Muhammad Jusuph (Jusuf) was born in Indramaju, West Java, in 1910. He re­
ceived a law degree from the University of Utrecht in 1937. He was a leader of 
Gerindo in Bandung on the eve of the war, and seems to have been involved in 
some kind of underground activity during the Occupation. The post-war PKI was 
founded on October 21, 1945, though the news did not reach the metropolitan 
press till November 6.
168
Governor and his subordinates were kept busy meeting the irregulars' 
requests for materiel, not the least of which were all kinds of facili­
ties in the economic sector. Unable to deny the new reality, the Japa­
nese, who till now had controlled the rubber, tobacco and other planta­
tions, abandoned them to Republican control. The workers* “* in the 
plantations, industries, and other economic sectors were now able to 
do something to give content to the Proclamation. Some enterprises 
and plantations could be exploited directly-- their products could be 
carried away, sold directly or exported overseas --and the profits used 
for purposes of defense. The British occupying forces seemed to take 
a laissez-faire laissez-passer attitude towards these export activi­
ties, and permitted the products of the former East Sumatra and Atjeh 
plantations to be taken off and sold on a large scale by our traders 
(who, killing two birds with one stone, were also freedom-fighters), 
since their destinations, whether Singapore itself, or Kelang and the 
ports of Malaya, were all still British colonies. This permissiveness 
had the effect of keeping basic prices low, while the British or their 
businessmen, whose profits had been small hitherto because of the ab­
sence of imported produce from Indonesia, need not run any risks; on 
the other hand, the price at which these goods were thrown on to the 
world market by Singapore ran up very quickly.
The British CID evidently made little serious effort to obstruct 
this barter trade (which allowed Indonesian patriots to smuggle in 
weapons from Singapore), since it helped the Singapore economy con­
siderably. Clearly, though, considering how effective their adminis­
trative apparatus was, not one gun would have got through had they 
really been opposed--except where the smuggling was detected or blocked 
by the Dutch Navy itself.
The products of this barter trade were very significant for in­
creasing the quantity of weapons required by our freedom-fighters in 
Atjeh and East Sumatra. Aside from that, the barter made it clear 
that our modern weapons were not solely the result of Japanese gifts. 
Indeed, as mentioned earlier, a good deal of the weapons from Japanese 
arsenals fell into the wrong hands. What Major Knottenbelt achieved 
during his stay in Atjeh (October 5 to November 10) is food for 
thought. Since August the British fleet had been stationed in Sabang 
and it included a Dutch warship. Had Knottenbelt really wished to 
prevent Japanese weapons from passing into Indonesian hands, it would 
have been easy for him to order all arms in Atjeh to be transported to 
the Allied warships in Sabang, leaving only a few ashore for security 
purposes. But Knottenbelt, protected by his function as Allied agent, 
carried on highly suspicious intrigues. Indeed it is very possible 
that his activities were the initial stimulus for the great suspicion 
the majority of the population felt with regard to a certain minority's 
sincerity in giving content to independence. He evidently expected 
that a struggle to the death between the two groups would weaken both, 
at which point he hoped he could emerge as a third party and reap the 
benefits. While he was in Kutaradja he exploited every opportunity 
offered him by the Republic's attitude that we were not in conflict 
with the Allies, indeed that we should extend our hands and be ready 
to provide assistance. The Resident did his best to help Knottenbelt, 
as evidenced by his willingness to make a dangerous sacrifice in 
arranging that when Knottenbelt had to leave for Medan in a hurry on 4
44. The author here uses the contemporary word karyawan (functionary) rather than 
the older buruh (worker).
169
November 10, he was not harmed on the way. After carrying out his 
duties and reporting to the Governor in Medan, perhaps Nja’ Arif al­
ready sensed the danger he was in, but his sense of obligation to be 
where duty called led him to return to Atjeh once again.
What happened in the following month led to Nja’ Arif’s having to 
be nsent away to safety’1 in Takeungon. Former Major-General Husin al- 
Mudjahid1*5 subsequently told the writer that it was precisely because 
the People’s Revolution group knew how innocent and honest Teuku Nja’ 
Arif was, that they felt he had to be quickly taken away to Takeungon 
to prevent him falling victim to blind excesses. Mudjahid said that 
though Teuku Nja’ Arif was an aristocrat (aside from being Republican 
Resident of Atjeh, he was also Panglima Sagi XXVI Mukim), he was not 
against the revolution. That he died there in Takeungon was purely 
the result of God’s power.
On December 12, the Japanese military headquarters in Lho’ Nga 
(on the coast of Atjeh Besar) was attacked by the people. Many weapons 
were seized, though many of the attackers fell and about fifty Japanese 
soldiers were killed. This made an enormous difference to the fighting 
capacity of the resistance in Atjeh. Six days later, Allied emissaries 
in Ulehleh decamped.
Four days later, on December 22, violent armed conflict erupted 
between the freedom-fighters and the uleebalang in Lam Meuloh (Pidie). 
Judging from the ’’press-release” of Teungku Abdul Wahab, First Chair­
man of the General People’s HQ in Sigli, as communicated by the offi­
cial Republican Government in Sumatra’s newspaper Suluh Merdeka in 
Medan on January 9, it is evident that large-scale clashes had broken 
out in Sigli, Lam Meulo and Meureudu.1*6 The press-release termed 
these clashes a ’’People’s Revolution” opposing the activities of the 
counter-revolutionaries, masterminded by Teuku Mohd. Daud, the uleeba­
lang of Tjumbok.45 67 It was stated that by its announcement of January 
6, 1946, the Republican government in Kutaradja supported this revolu­
tion, which not long afterwards (January 18) was successfully com­
pleted.
News of the people’s revolution in Atjeh spread down widely into 
East Sumatra, and was evidently not treated as smoke vanishing in the 
wind.
45. Teungku Husin al-Mudjahid was well-known in the late Dutch period as the mili­
tant leader of the Pemuda PUSA, youth arm of the strongly anti-Dutch ulama 
organization PUSA (Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Atjeh--All-Atjeh Union of Ulama).
He was believed by the Dutch to be closely involved with the F-Organization. 
After the Proclamation of Independence, he became an important politico-mili­
tary figure in Atjeh.
46. Teungku Abdul Wahab, ulama in Seulimeum, was a well-known PUSA leader in pre­
war days. He attained new prominence under the Japanese, as a member of the 
Atjeh Residency Advisory Council, member of the Japanese-instituted Residency- 
level Islamic court, and head of the Seulimeum branch of the Maibkatra, the 
Atjehnese equivalent of BOMPA.
47. Teuku Sri Muda Pahlawan Bentara Tjumbok Muhammad Daud was among the most ener­
getic and aggressive of the younger uleebalang in the later Dutch period. (A 
sketch of his personality and early life is given in Piekaar, Atjeh, p. 129.)
170
Whether it was connected or not with the influence of this news, 
on January 12, 1946, a statement was issued by various sultans in East 
Sumatra that they and their territories stood behind the Republic.
This statement was conveyed in a meeting with the Vice-Governor Dr. M. 
Amir, accompanied by Resident Tengku Hafas and Vice-Resident Junus 
Nasution. But the only radja to appear in person was the Sultan of 
Langkat; the rest were represented by emissaries. These included 
Tengku Besar Radjih Anwar for Serdang (the Sultan himself did not 
appear because he was old and sickly). Deli was represented by two 
Datuk (there being no word as to whether the Sultan was prevented from 
coming by sickness). Asahan was totally not in evidence. (One could 
note here that these four kingdoms --Deli, Langkat, Serdang and Asahan-- 
were the big principalities, the rest were quite small.) The presence 
of Dr. Amir representing the Governor gave the impression that the 
autonomous principality question belonged in his "file." Amir evi­
dently saw that something was afoot. Or perhaps, in such an atmos­
phere, he was being seriously approached by the Sultan of Langkat both 
as to his thinking as well as on the matter of personal safety. Amir 
had worked since the Dutch period as Landschaparts (Doctor to the Prin­
cipality) of Langkat, and the Sultan felt very well disposed towards 
him.
On February 3, a further official meeting was held with the 
rulers of East Sumatra, this time chaired in person by Governor Hassan. 
Attending for the Republican government were: Vice-Governor Dr. M.
Amir, Resident Tengku Hafas, Resident seconded to the Governor Karim 
Ms., Inspector of Education Abu Bakar, Chief Prosecutor Muthalib Moro, 
All-Sumatra Health Inspector Dr. Mansur, Vice-Resident Junus Nasution, 
and Mayor Mr. Mohd. Jusuf. For the Sultans there attended: Langkat,
Siak, Deli, Asahan, Mahkota, Serdang, the Jang Dipertuan of Kualuh- 
Ledong, the Sutan of Bila, the Sutan of Panei, the Radja of Siantar, 
Indrapura, Sukudua, Lima Puluh, Purba, V Kuta, and Raja and the Siba- 
j ak of Barus Djahe.
At this meeting, the Governor explained that the autonomous terri­
tories were recognized as special regions on the basis of section 2 of 
Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution. All expressed their support for 
the Republic, while the Governor stressed that they should go down 
into the community and act like fathers to the people.
If one took the outcome of this meeting at face value, one could 
conclude that the position of the autonomous territories and their 
officials was now cleared. But in reality things were much less prom­
ising. First of all, none of the sultans or radja involved were capa­
ble of becoming popular leaders or fathers of the people--they had 
never been educated or trained to fill such roles. This aside, their 
routine administrative functions, such as collecting taxes, directing 
corvee labor, and presiding over judicial proceedings, could no longer 
be carried on. Not only were people no longer willing to come to the 
rulers' offices because of the drastic change in the atmosphere, but 
often the rulers' officials themselves did not show up at their offices 
any more, having either adapted themselves to the developing revolu­
tion, or for other reasons.
The result was that only one choice still lay open to the sultans 
and radja: to listen to the radio in their palaces, quietly follow
further developments, and, naturally, to find out what the attitude of 
the Dutch was and what the Dutch were currently doing to reconquer 
their colony. It was precisely this that unavoidably became a matter
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of vital concern to the sultans and radja involved. If they could 
sift out the news coming in over the radio, they could certainly con­
clude that the Dutch day was done. On the other hand, if they could 
not, they would be tempted by the possibility of a Dutch "come-back,” 
this would have its influence on them, and the long-run consequences 
could be serious, especially if they continued to isolate themselves 
within their palaces.
In the event, things turned out precisely this way. The atten­
tion of the freedom-fighters was turned to the rulers. Reports from 
Atjeh revealed that part of the property of the overthrown counter­
revolutionaries had been seized, and then collected together and en­
trusted to a commission specially established as a kind of probate 
office. The rulers’ assets were paid out as compensation for people 
who had suffered wrongs at the hands of these counter-revolutionaries. 
The whole business was organized with full accountability, and every­
thing had to be approved by the Examining Council, which was specially 
set up and given authority for this purpose, inter alia to determine 
whether the seized property could be returned to the owners or was 
needed for carrying on the revolution.
From all indications, the Atjeh Affair was a matter of constant 
discussion within the closed circle around the Governor. It was not 
only that the Governor was in mourning for his father (who rumor had 
it was among the victims of the Affair); but was it not possible that, 
if the "people’s revolution” spread to East Sumatra, a fate more or 
less like what had overtaken Nja’ Arif as a side-effect of that revo­
lution might happen to him?
At that time, in the first two weeks of February, the writer was 
still in Medan and had no idea he would be sent on a mission to Java.
It should be noted that in January the writer sat on the leadership 
board of the Sumatra Information Bureau: the director was Dr. Amir,
his deputy was Mr. Luat Siregar, Jahja Jakub was head of the press 
section, and the writer in charge of the political and research sec­
tions. The secretary was Jusuf Abdullah Puar. But although the 
writer had been granted this official designation, after inauguration 
he never once went to the office or took part in its affairs, primar­
ily because he felt very uncomfortable as a government official, and 
preferred to be independent, on his own, and secondarily because he 
knew that Jahja and Puar were more than adequate to run such an office. 
Nonetheless, since there was a need for the necessary leadership to 
observe the development of the revolution in Java, the writer was 
assigned ex officio to travel across to Java along with Jahja Jakub.
Nonetheless, our departure was still up in the air, for Dr. Amir 
hoped to be able to "bum” a ride on an Allied plane as he had done 
when he went to Java together with Mr. Luat Siregar. This left our 
departure up in the air, till in the end we decided to go by land.
Stepping down from the Sukamulia office staircase after the cere­
mony of accepting the allegiance of the sultans and radja on February 
3, the writer accosted Karim Ms. and jokingly asked him what all this 
business of assembling the radja to convey their sentiments of loyalty 
was about: Was it still another imitation of our Elder Brothers’
style?1*8 He answered (evidently rather seriously) that the consequences 48
48. The reference is to the Japanese, who liked to term themselves the "elder 
brothers” of the Indonesians.
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would become clear once the Governor had left. It was only from this 
remark that the writer learned that the Governor was going on an in­
spection tour far to the south and would be away for a long time. The 
writer did not respond, though at that time he did not suspect there 
was anything behind it. Only after studying the events of the "social 
revolution" some years later, did the writer attempt to solve the prob­
lem of whether or not there was a "background" to the Governor’s depar­
ture. Clearly there were various possible answers depending on one’s 
starting point.
First of all, as the highest government authority in Sumatra, Gov­
ernor Hassan was undoubtedly required to make inspection tours, both 
for purposes of consolidation and indoctrination, a synchronization 
activated by Sukarno and Hatta. Along with the Governor went various 
senior officials as well as Abdul Karim Ms. himself, the master orator. 
His participation would certainly aid the achievement of this goal.
This first possible interpretation could, of course, be officially an­
nounced.
The second possibility was that the Governor was deliberately 
pushed (by Karim or someone else who knew that there is "no smoke with­
out a fire") to go on a distant trip, so that uncontrollable elements 
could do as they pleased in the absence of the top Sumatran leadership, 
Governor Hassan. For in spite of everything, at the start of the revo­
lution Hassan was a symbol allowing all the guardians of the revolution 
to declare that the Indonesian Republic was strong under his leader­
ship. Thus, if he was not on the spot, he would not have to accept 
responsibility.
The third possibility is that the aim was to prevent excesses--so 
that the Governor need not be Teuku-Nja1-ArifTed: in other words, so
that with the launching of the "social revolution," the Governor as an 
aristocrat would not become its victim. It was for this reason that he 
was willing to choose to make a tour of inspection. Naturally neither 
the second or the third possibility could ever be made public. The 
writer himself was unsuccessful in establishing for certain whether 
these possibilities were merely his own "wishful thinking" or not, 
since Karim died before the writer got the idea of including the 
"social revolution" in his memoirs.
Another question which must be answered, if one wishes to complete 
this commentary, is: what was the real object of the East Sumatran
"social revolution"? Was it to put an end to the adventurism of the 
counter-revolutionaries who were known to be very active and busy 
building up their forces, or was it simply to seize control of their 
possessions and property?
The writer met Dr. Amir in his office at the beginning of February 
--after the Governor had left for the south. I don’t know why he sum­
moned me alone, not along with Jahja Jakub, when he handed me my creden­
tials and a short report to be transmitted to Prime Minister Sjahrir.
In a joking way, Amir said: "Now then, Saudara Said! Now that Mangku-
bumi’s gone (that was our nickname then for Governor Hassan), we’re 
freer to make decisions and act. I’ve managed to get Saleh Umar out 
of Allied jail today, in exchange for one of our Allied prisoners. He 
had a very bad time, beaten with rotan rods by Turk Westerling. 9 49
49. The subsequently notorious Lieutenant MTurk” Westerling had been parachuted into 
Medan in the middle of September 1945 to organize an anti-Republican police
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Amir added that Saleh Umar was needed to expedite the revolution.
In those days, when we met, Amir would still crack jokes, a carry­
over from what we used to do to relieve the constant psychological 
pressure caused by Japanese oppression. But this time his heavy 
breathing and drawn expression gave the impression that he was hiding 
something very grave and serious behind what he said, and pretending 
that "we're just playing roles here now." He seemed to recognize that 
what he was facing was a reality, indeed a very grave one. What he 
recognized was in sharpest contrast to what he had assumed thus far: 
he had been totally wrong in thinking that everything was just a play. 
This recognition was plainly visible in his face and in his thinking.
At our meeting that day (which was also our parting), there was 
not a whisper about the possibility of a "social revolution." What 
happened after the writer left for Java evidently developed with extra­
ordinary speed. On February 14 the writer was still able to attend 
the formation of the East Sumatra People's Front (Volksfront) under 
the twin top leadership of Sarwono and Saleh Umar. As soon as the 
writer returned from Java, he immediately set out to get reliable in­
formation on the course of what was called the "social revolution."
In general, the answers were everywhere the same. The feudalists were 
in the wrong. Period! For this reason, much time was needed to gather 
real and trustworthy facts. Only four months after leaving East Suma­
tra, much had changed. Junus was under detention and Dr. Amir had 
fled to the [Allied] camp.
From reading back over the issues of the Medan newspapers while I 
was gone, I found a number of interesting items including the follow­
ing: Major Ferguson is here, "social revolution" happens to break out.
From the first release, issued by the Bureau of Information (under 
Dr. Amir's leadership), it could be ascertained that by February 27 a 
certain Major Ferguson, an Englishman from the Allied Forces, had ar­
rived in Medan. It was also reported that Vice-Governor Amir and party 
were taking Ferguson on an inspection tour that day to Asahan, from 
there circling round through Simelungun (Siantar) and returning again 
to Medan on March 2. The purpose of the Vice-Governors tour was 
stated as being to check up on popular support for the Republic. The 
names of those mentioned as being in his party were Vice-Resident Junus 
Nasution, Dr. Sunarjo, Mangatas Nasution, Police Chief Abas, Nurmatias, 
S. H. Simatupang (Posts, Telephone and Telegraph), Muchlis, Adjib, 
Nazir, Harun Lubis, J. M. Zein, M. K. Kasiman (ERRI), Sabirin Gani 
(Pesindo) and S. Soufron (PKI).50 The party was really rather large, 
but the most interest thing [about it] was that Ferguson joined it. 
Surely it is too much of a coincidence that it was precisely when he
force. In this he was quite successful, though his comrade-in-arms, Lieutenant 
Brondgeest, commented on his ’’occasional use of somewhat inhuman methods." 
Westerling had been attached to the ADCS mentioned above. For more details on 
the activities of Brondgeest and Westerling, see Reid, "The Birth," p. 32.
50. ERRI--Ekonomi Rakjat Republik Indonesia (People*s Economy of the Republic of 
Indonesia)--was a short-lived body set up at the height of the "social revolu­
tion" in the spring of 1946 to control plantation products and basic commodi­
ties, ostensibly at least for socialist purposes, and to prevent such supplies 
falling into Allied hands.
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was in East Sumatra and was on a tour through the area that the "social 
revolution" broke out. In Asahan they were the Sultan’s guests.
On March 3, Major Ferguson held a meeting with Vice-Resident Junus 
Nasution, accompanied by Mr. Jusuf (who usually acted as interpreter) 
and Police Chief Raden Suleiman. This meeting was described as "cor­
dial" by the Information Bureau in a circular, but nothing was men­
tioned about what was discussed.
The writer heard directly (at first hand) from one of the main 
actors in the Simelungun sector, A. E. Saragih Ras, that the "social 
revolution" was planned to break out simultaneously at midnight, March 
3-4, 1946. On March 4 rumors were spreading rapidly. On the morning 
of March 5, Vice-Governor Dr. Amir issued a proclamation mentioning 
the occurrence of the "social revolution." He was the first to use 
the term without quotation marks. Evidently he considered the "smash­
ing"51 of the aristocracy a social revolution. Perhaps the idea came 
to him then because he was reminded of the "smashing" of Louis XVI and 
Marie Antoinette who went to the gallows [sio] because the French 
wanted to destroy the monarchy with its class society and replace it 
with a republic with its sama rata sama rasa (liberte^ equalite [sic], 
fraternite).52 What one heard had happened at that time in East Suma­
tra was butchery and seizure of property, but the abolition of the 
autonomous territories was not at that time one of the movement’s aims.
The proclamation, personally signed by Dr. Amir himself, consisted 
of eight articles. Article 5 stated that government in East Sumatra 
was consigned to the hands of Junus Nasution, with the rank of Resi­
dent. (This meant that Resident Tengku Hafas was dismissed.) In per­
forming his functions Junus was to be assisted by the Working Committee 
of the local National Committee and by the Volksfront. This proclama­
tion was countersigned (supported) by the chairman of the East Sumatra 
National Committee, Mr. Luat Siregar.53 It was by no means clear 
whether all autonomous territorial institutions were abolished by vir­
tue of this proclamation, or indeed what the substance of it precisely 
was. Of more long-term importance was the question of the very legal­
ity of the proclamation itself, its legal base and its legal conse­
quences .
The Information Bureau was very active putting out communiques, 
though these were very general and said little in detail about what 
had happened and why. Communique No. 2 stated that on that date the 
government had assigned two key leaders, Junus Nasution and Mr. Luat 
Siregar, to tour East Sumatra to control the situation and ensure
51. The writer uses the word ganjang (Javanese for ’bite,’ fchew up') which was 
introduced into the Indonesian political vocabulary by Sukarno at the beginning 
of Confrontation.
52. Sama rata sama rasa— lit., on the same level, feeling as one.
53. Soon after the Proclamation of Independence, the central government had ordered 
the setting up of local National Committees at each level of administration to 
give direction to the revolution. Their power and effectiveness varied greatly 
from area to area and level to level. In most cases, owing to their relatively 
large size and infrequent meetings, their powers were delegated to so-called 
Working Committees, which acted as nday-to-day executives.”
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security. The next report stated that on that very day, March 5, Mr. 
Luat had left town, taking with him in his party Sarwono, Saleh Umar 
and Sutjipto. (There were apparently two Sutjipto's--one a son-in-law 
of Karim Ms., a colonel, left-wing like his father-in-law, who later 
left the army; the other reportedly becoming a major and being assigned 
to the economic sector.) It was reported that the area to be covered 
by Junus Nasution, who also left town, was to be Tanah Karo and Lang- 
kat. The reports on Junus' expedition out of town mentioned that he 
had already successfully brought order to Bindjei and Sunggal. From 
there he continued his tour to Brastagi, accompanied by a party from 
the National Committee.
On Asahan, it was reported that there had been some resistance 
and that the Sultan had finally fled after this resistance was broken.
A clash had occurred at Pulau Buaja (on the Asahan River). It was re­
ported that the Sultan later surrendered and that his troops were dis­
armed.
With regard to the announcement of the abolition of the autono­
mous territories, some were publicly proclaimed, others were handled 
more casually. One mass meeting held in the courtyard of the National 
Committee in Djalan Mahkamah on March 7 took the decision to abolish 
the autonomous territory of Deli. On that occasion Mr. Mahadi, ex­
secretary to the Sultan, was present.
The announcement of the abolition of the principality of Langkat 
was made at a mass meeting in Bindjei. Subsequently a party led by 
Sarwono, Jusuf Puar and Malik Munir visited Langkat on March 12 and 
held various meetings there.5  ^ The Englishman, Major Ferguson, went 
along, accompanying the party as far as Teluk Aru.
Further, the announcement of a series of new appointments was 
made public to establish a new, direct system of government. Govern­
ment in Simelungun was entrusted to Urbanus Pardede, assisted by Madja 
Purba; in Asahan to Abdullah Eteng, assisted by Sori Harahap; in Labu- 
han Batu to Abdul Rahman and Dr. Hidajat. It was also reported that 
the aged Jang Dipertuan of Kualuh-Ledong had been killed. In Batu 
Bara administration was put in the hands of Umar Pane.
But alongside all this activity by civilian leaders, an announce­
ment was also issued by the TRI Division Commander. This announcement, 
signed by Col. A. Tahir at noon on March 5, declared that government 
throughout East Sumatra had been taken into the hands of the TRI.54 5
54. Malik Munir was a leading figure in the nationalist scouting movement in Medan 
before the war, and also taught in Muhammadijah schools in various parts of 
Sumatra. During the war he was an advisor to BOMPA. Many of the more activist 
pemuda, such as Sarwono, Tahir and others had been scouts or students under him.
55. In January 1946, the name TKR was changed to TRI (Tentara Rakjat Indonesia-- 
Indonesian People's Army). Achmad Tahir (real name, Hopman Sitompul), was b o m  
in Kisaran, N. Sumatra, in 1924. He joined the Giyugun (Volunteer Army) estab­
lished on a highly decentralized basis in 1943 by the Japanese authorities in 
Sumatra. Unlike the Peta in Java, the Giyugun was only organized up to the com­
pany level. Tahir was highly successful and ended up as a shotaichd (company 
commander). After the Proclamation of Independence he was active, with Malik 
Munir and others, in setting up a Barisan Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth 
League) in Medan, one of the better disciplined irregular units. Shortly
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The announcement meant that governmental authority from that moment 
passed under military control. Whether this was done at Col. Tahir's 
personal initiative or was the result of a mandate he received from 
Dr. Amir, is by no means clear. What is quite certain is that the 
authority to declare this SOB (martial law) was not granted by the 
center--given the conditions existing then it was not possible that 
the critical news from East Sumatra had yet reached the center.
On March 14, Dr. Amir signed a decree on the formation of a colle 
gial government for East Sumatra. He formed what was known as the 
Governing Council, composed as follows: Chairman, Junus Nasution;
Vice-Chairman, Dr. Gindo Siregar; members, Hadji Abdul Rahman Sjihab, 
M. Saleh Umar, and A. Muthalib Moro. 5 6 Here again Junus1 name appeared 
conspicuously in first place--whether as a result of close cooperation 
between him and Amir, or because he had put Amir under heavy pressure.
That the situation was still far from clear can be seen from the 
appointments made on March 23 by Col. A. Tahir under his martial law 
authority. He appointed Mahruzar, a "businessman,M as Resident of 
East Sumatra, and Moh. Jusuf as Mayor of Medan with a Governing Coun­
cil for East Sumatra consisting of Dr. Gindo, Moro, Sjihab, Junus Nasu 
tion and Saleh Umar. In this list we can see that while Junus was 
still included, his position had declined; the same happened to Saleh 
Umar.
Thus in the space of less than two weeks we can observe the posi­
tion of Resident passing from T. Hafas to Junus Nasution to Mahruzar.
Meanwhile, in the first week of April, Governor Hassan returned 
from his tour of inspection. His first act was to issue a proclama­
tion on April 9 abolishing military government, and putting power back 
in civilian hands as normal. On April 12, he appointed Mr. Luat Sire- 
gar as Resident of East Sumatra, at the same time relieving Mahruzar 
of his post. Luat was succeeded as Chairman of the East Sumatra 
National Committee by Dr. G. Sunarjo. On April 25, Dr. Amir fled to 
the Allied camp.
Darkness in Light
For a long time indeed after his return from Djakarta, the writer 
tried to obtain somewhat reliable data about the "social revolution," 
but without success. What one heard when the affair was still "hot" 
was all in the same vein and from the same perspective: the rulers
and aristocrats were traitors to the revolution, agents of the Dutch 
or Fifth Column. That was why action had to be taken against them. 
More than that, one still frequently heard loud threats that anyone 
taking the side of the rulers would be regarded as traitors too and 56
thereafter he joined the new Republican Army. (For material on the Giyugun, 
see Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation," pp. 128-129; for some background on 
Tahir, see Mekar Sari, June 1, 1966; and Kelompok Kerdja Staf Angkatan Bersen- 
djata, Sedjarah Singkat Perdjuangan Bersendjata Bangsa Indonesia [Djakarta: 
n.p., 1964].)
56. Dr. Gindo Siregar was a well-known plantation doctor and nationalist in the 
Medan area before the war.
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would be dealt with, just as their masters had been. As far as proofs 
went, all kinds were on sale; whether they were plausible or implaus­
ible was a secondary consideration. For example, there was a widely- 
circulated story that a Dutch flag had been spread out on the flat 
roof of the house of Tengku Musa, the second man in the sultanate of 
Asahan, and a man notorious for his Dutch ways. No one would be sui­
cidal enough to express any open doubts on this.
Oil the other side, in the area occupied by the Allies and NICA, 
the talk was also in one vein and from one perspective--only the direc­
tion was 180 degrees away. The leaders and the pemuda of the Indone­
sian Republic were terrorists whose one aim was to butcher the feudal 
group and steal their property, precisely in order to take their place 
as a new feudal group. Republicans in the occupied areas, who were 
now there in the minority, had to suppress their feelings, particular­
ly after the Republican capital of Sumatra had to be moved from Medan 
to Pematang Siantar. Most of the photographs on the development of 
our Air Force under Commodore Suriadarma, which the writer brought 
from Jogja and which had just been put on display in the window of his 
office at Pusat Pasar 126, were ruined and scattered by native NICA 
troops who evidently could not stand the sight of our capability in 
this sector.
Accordingly, all these contradictory reports must be sifted with 
a critical eye if one wants to obtain some reliable documentation of 
the period. For what could be noted down at the time about the 
nsocial revolution” were only vague and obscure reports which needed 
serious checking. On one occasion, when the writer had only just re­
turned from Djakarta, and was in the interior {de facto Republican 
territory), he joined the party of a committee of the East Sumatra 
legislature on an inspection of what was called a ’’People’s Prison.”
But neither from the party as a whole nor from the individuals in it 
did the writer get any useful information, except that the prisoners 
were very well treated, and that some of them had been put away simply 
to safeguard their physical security. When we arrived at the People’s 
Prison in Raja, the writer met two aristocrats, Tengku J. (Serdang) 
and Tengku M.A. (Langkat). Since they were personal acquaintances of 
the writer, they had no hesitation in expressing their protests --among 
other things they asked why they were under detention and why they had 
not been brought before a court of law if they had indeed committed 
any crimes. Naturally the writer could only answer with a smile--at 
that time, he was only a reporter for Antara. (Note: When the writer
met Adam Malik in Jogja c. April 1946, he was given a full mandate to 
build up branches of Antara throughout Sumatra, with the writer him­
self as chief resident representative.57 When the writer met Minister 
of Information Moh. Natsir in Djakarta and took the opportunity to 
pass on his impressions of his travels from Djakarta to our frontmost 
lines in Surabaja, he expressed his conclusion that the number one 
priority program for Sumatra was to disseminate fully all revolution­
ary activities via the medium of Antara, i.e., that the activities of 
the Ministry of Information were not enough in themselves. Natsir ex­
pressed his strong approval of this conclusion, and accepted the 
writer’s request not to have to be appointed a high Information Minis­
try official.)
57. Antara (originally founded in 1937 by Adam Malik and other nationalist journal­
ists, merged with Domei by the Japanese, and re-opened after the Proclamation 
of Independence) was the semi-official Republican news-agency.
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In another "People's Prison"--for VIP's, in the house of the 
former administrator of the Bah Birung Ulu Estate, the writer met the 
Sultan of Asahan.58 He made no bones about showing his anger at the 
way that he had been treated. From the Sultan himself the writer 
learned that he had indeed received some arms, a few rifles, from the 
Japanese. The Japanese intent had been to turn these weapons over to 
the Republic, but the one addressee whom the Japanese trusted for de­
livery of these arms, according to the Sultan of Asahan, was he him­
self. He added that as a matter of fact he was on the point of person­
ally transferring these weapons to the legal Republican authorities.
But before the transfer could be accomplished his palace was suddenly 
surrounded, and he was forced to react in self-defense. As we have 
mentioned, the Sultan of Asahan was the only ruler to put up any re­
sistance. Because his foes were too strong, he retreated, and after 
swimming with great difficulty across the river, he sought protection 
at a Japanese guard-post, which he reached safely. The Japanese mili­
tary then turned him over to the Republican authorities.
To make a long story short, not much could be gleaned from re­
search of this kind. As a matter of fact, the writer, though a report­
er, never took a press card along with him or showed it around, either 
in the interior or in the occupied zone: it seemed that the writer's
appearance was more than enough identification of his function. None­
theless this freedom did not mean that one could safely ignore unpleas­
ant possibilities in the sensitive atmosphere. Whispering and gossip 
could be pretty poisonous. Someone with a grudge from the past could 
easily slander one by spreading rumors, and his audience might not 
think twice before believing them and taking immediate action. Gossip 
which started out as curling wisps of smoke might suddenly become a 
dangerous fire--for example, gossip about the wives of civilian or 
military leaders wearing too many jewels could easily be associated 
with looted feudal treasures. A total unknown, called Logam, suddenly 
acquired a big reputation because he was able to spread some gossip 
effectively enough to stir up the public and throw harsh light on a 
number of high military and civilian leaders. These leaders had to 
undergo some highly unpleasant experiences before it was understood 
that Logam was being manipulated from behind the scenes by certain 
destructive elements. Gossip also caused the fall of several quite 
innocent notables, for example Police Chief S,59 and a close relative 
of one of the revolutionary leaders himself.
It is for this reason that the writer feels he cannot report even 
indubitable facts simply as he pleases. At the same time, the curious 
thing is something that the writer never heard of as the object of 
gossip or a whispering campaign: i.e., the fact that an ultra-luxuri­
ous automobile belonging to the Sultan of Langkat--it was a Maybach 
sports-car, custom-ordered on the eve of World War II--was publicly 
used shortly after the "social revolution" by none other than the PKI 
leader, Abdul Karim Ms. himself! Once when the writer happened to be 
in Siantar, Karim invited him along for a ride. And indeed, aside 
from being very comfortable, it went like the wind. It took only six 
minutes to cover the fifteen kilometers from Siantar to Tiga Balata.
As has already been mentioned, Karim Ms. had accompanied Governor 
Hassan on his tour of inspection to the south, and he clearly had not
58. This was Mahmoed Abdul Djalil Rachmat Sjah, who ascended the throne in 1927.
59. Possibly the Suleiman mentioned above.
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participated in the "social revolution." But it remained a big ques­
tion how the Maybach came into his hands and was used quite openly by 
him. If there was one piece of feudal property which was publicly 
used by someone not its owner, it was this Maybach sports-car.
Rather cautiously the writer tried to ask him directly whether it 
was really appropriate to use such an ostentatious, luxurious object. 
But it seemed as if Karim already expected some question of this kind 
about the car. He turned the question back: "What is the use of
Merdeka [Freedom] if it is not to be enjoyed? What is the signifi­
cance of a Maybach by comparison with the Tsar's Palace Lenin occu­
pied?" He went further and insisted that in a rather long drawn-out 
revolution like our own, what was needed was not just one Maybach, but 
ten, or even hundreds, "don't you know?" The writer was completely 
KO'd by this.
About that time the Sultan of Langkat himself was in Pematang 
Siantar. He was evidently not put into the VIP People's Prison at Bah 
Birung Ulu, but was rather boarded at the shop of a Pakistani merchant 
in Wilhelminastraat (now Djalan Sutomo). Since the street was very 
busy, and the Sultan of Langkat himself often looked out of the second- 
floor windows, he was easy for people to see.
To discover how the Sultan of Langkat had managed to find shelter 
there was not easy either. Some unconfirmed sources stated that he 
had long been personally acquainted with Jakub Siregar, and that al­
ready in the Japanese period he had become aware of changing times.
The story went that he was more suspicious of his own circle than of 
the revolutionaries. In the Dutch period there had once been an at­
tempt to kill him by poison, known to have been engineered by an aris­
tocrat close to him whose mouth watered for his throne. As a result 
the Sultan had felt quite unsafe sleeping at his palaces in Bindjei 
and Tandjungpura, and always stayed at his bungalow in Manggalaan, 
Medan. Perhaps it was with the aid of Amir or some other influential 
leaders that the Sultan of Langkat managed to find safety in the mar­
ketplace of Pematang Siantar.
Nonetheless the question still remains open why he escaped, and 
why, on the other hand, Tengku Amir Hamzah (the celebrated national 
poet) was killed.60 The writer once cautiously addressed this ques­
tion to Saleh Umar who was one of the strong men of East Sumatra at 
that time, and who was the one man the writer believed to be a reli­
able source of information on these events. Without having to think 
twice, Saleh Umar immediately answered: Tengku Amir Hamzah's only
mistake was that he held two offices (dwifungsi)61 which were mutually 
contradictory. At that time Tengku Amir Hamzah was both the Sultan's 
representative, and so had to defend the sultanate, and Regional Head 
''Bupati) of the Republican Government for the kabupaten (regency) of 
Langkat, who had to join the masses, lead the revolution and at the 
same time defend the interests of the Republic. Nonetheless, Saleh 
Umar said nothing about the facts which opened Tengku Amir Hamzah to
60. Tengku Amir Hamzah gelar Inderaputra (1911-1946) was from the royal family of 
Langkat. He attended high school in Java, and for a time studied law in Dja­
karta and Leiden. In the judgment of many, he was modern Indonesia's greatest 
poet.
61. A phrase coined long after the revolution, usually used to describe the twin 
defense and socio-political roles of the military.
180
charges of treason. The writer was chatting with Saleh Umar in a 
coffee-stall in Tebing Tinggi. Since we had known each other well 
since we were young reporters together, we weren’t used to picking out 
some special place for having a chat, it didn’t matter that he was by 
then Vice-Resident. But at that time the writer didn’t simply think 
of having a discussion with just a poet. Like Tengku Amir Hamzah, he 
too was a son of Langkat.
Previously some mention has been made of the presence in East 
Sumatra of a Major Ferguson, a British intelligence agent, just at the 
moment that the ’’social revolution” erupted. He had been taken along 
on an inspection tour by Dr. Amir to Tandjung Balai and Pematang Sian- 
tar from February 27 to March 2, and was introduced everywhere as 
Amir’s guest. The next day, March 3-4, immediately following his re­
turn to Medan, the ’’social revolution” broke out. In that atmosphere 
it was reported that Resident Junus Nasution was out of town to check 
out on the spot the outbreak of the ”S.R.” But that same week it was 
also reported that Ferguson had gone along as a member of Junus Nasu- 
tion’s party to Langkat, an area which also had experienced the anti- 
feudal hurricane.
Because Ferguson was present at the moments that the affair oc­
curred, he naturally became an object of suspicion, irrespective of 
whether facts could or could not be produced to raise the suspicions to 
the level of accusations. Dr. Amir himself, the Vice-Governor who had 
given him so many facilities for moving about in de facto Republican 
territory, could not escape suspicion either. It is not impossible that 
Amir and Ferguson were working together. People got this impression 
from the fact that not long afterwards Amir fled to the Allied camp. 
There is no convincing indication, let alone proof, that either Amir’s 
life or his family's were in any danger. From a very close relative 
of his, Adinegoro, the writer heard that Dr. Amir was driven by his 
Dutch wife to choose: either continue serving the Republic or by
joining his wife and children who were determined to return to the 
Moederland [motherland]. Dr. Amir chose the second alternative. In 
the midst of all this pressure, it seemed, however, that Amir still 
wanted to play a role by dragging things out, and that was why he OK’d, 
signed or granted whatever any particular leader urged on him, while 
he still had the opportunity, i.e., while Governor Hassan was still on 
his inspection tour to the south. It turned out that Amir had been 
making plans to flee to the Allied camp for a long time. Whether or 
not he was helped in this by Major Ferguson is something which badly 
needs to be demonstrated, if we want to unmask Ferguson’s involvement 
in the chaos that raged at that time. On April 23, Allied troops were 
put on guard at Dr. Amir's house in Djalan Bulan 16. Only on the 
following day did he flee to the camp, where he could rest easy under 
the protection of the Gurkhas.
The writer has tried to dig up more information about Ferguson, 
but without success. It is quite common for men like him, who have 
been eye-witnesses of extraordinary events, to talk about them or write 
up their reminiscences in an article or a volume of some sort. For 
example, Major Knottenbelt, whom we have mentioned as being in Kuta- 
radja at the beginning of the revolution, described his impressions in 
Vrij Nederland (January 14, 1946). It is quite likely that Ferguson 
did the same, and from the truth or falseness of his version. . . , 6 2 62
62. This sentence is incomplete in the original Indonesian, probably by a printer's 
error.
181
Once, on a visit to London, the writer took the opportunity to go to 
the British Museum and look for Ferguson1s name in the authors1 index, 
but did not find it. But the writer did on that occasion have the 
good luck to get acquainted with Prof. Gardner, curator of the South­
east Asian section of the Museum library. He introduced himself to 
the writer as a British private in a squad which was attacked by the 
Lasjkar Rakjat [irregulars] at Brastagi, Tanah Karo, in October 1945. 
Gardner described to the writer in some detail his being wounded while 
his unit was driving in jeeps up the last steep slope into Brastagi.
He fell, but was rescued by civilians and was taken to the local Japa­
nese military post; from there he was taken back to safety in Medan.
It is very likely indeed that Major Ferguson sent in a secret 
official report on the ’’social Revolution” in East Sumatra to his 
superiors, whether to Lord Mountbatten, who had by then moved his head­
quarters from Kandy to Singapore, or directly to the Foreign Ministry 
in London. If some such report exists, perhaps it will only be possi­
ble to read it when the ’’secrecy” period for such documents is over.
So it can be said that the writer was not very successful in 
learning any more data and facts about the ’’social revolution” than 
what has been laid out above. But perhaps the above notes may have 
some use in opening the way to acquiring further information.
A Confession
At the beginning of May 1950 the writer was chosen by the PNI con­
ference as First Chairman/North Sumatra, even though the writer was 
actually still a ’’newcomer,” in fact had never been registered as a 
party member. Because the election took place in the writer’s absence, 
the writer accepted it respectfully and with appreciation, especially 
after learning that the vote had been unanimous. After that the writer was 
active in leading the North Sumatra PNI up until 1954. The three-point 
urgency program of the PNI of North* Sumatra at that time was enough to 
give anybody a headache:
1) Defend the rights of the peasants to the land they cultivate 
on concession land, who, by the terms of the Round Table Con­
ference can not be summarily evicted without their consent;
2) Demand the nationalization of ^he BPM oil-wells in North 
Sumatra; and
3) Demand the release of PNI political leaders in detention.
These three questions all escalated into national issues, the 
most controversial being peasant-cultivated land, which culminated in 
the celebrated Tandjong Morawa Affair.63 The demand for the nationali­
zation of BPM was no less heated an argument, to the point that it 
seriously exacerbated conflict between the PNI and Masjumi. The 
Masjumi obstinately insisted on immediately returning the oil-wells to
63. For details on the 1953 Tandjong Morawa Affair, in which five peasant squatters 
who resisted eviction were killed by the police, see Herbert Feith, The Decline 
of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1962), pp. 294-296.
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their respective concessionaires.6 * In the end, the result came close 
to the demands of the North Sumatra PNI, and if today we have a large 
state oil company called Pertamina, don’t forget that its origin way 
back was the demands and decisions of the North Sumatra PNI.
As for the third issue, the release of PNI leaders, among those 
who made direct contact with the writer by letter were: (1) Saleh
Umar (comrade-in-arms/partner of Jakub Siregar); and (2) Selamat 
Ginting.
Saleh Umar had been detained because of the security situation 
and because jewels seized from the feudal groups were found in his 
hands. Many efforts were made on the two men’s behalf, and on one 
occasion both were released, only to be re-arrested two days later at 
the orders of Col. Simbolon64 5 6 (just as Saleh Umar and Jakub Siregar 
were about to take the plane for Djakarta). It was only much later on 
that they were finally released without ever being brought to trial. 
Their case was dideponeerd (permanently closed).
With regard to the security issue, it seems as if this was con­
nected with the behavior of the Barisan Harimau Liar, of which the two 
men were known to be the prime leaders. Since the BHL business was 
also rather closely related to the activities of the Japanese Kempei- 
tai figure Captain Inouye, whom the Allies had classified as a war 
criminal, and since their practices were reported to be very cruel, 
the Allies paid special attention to them. The writer got this impres­
sion from a meeting with Stan Swinton, an American reporter for the 
Associated Press, who was covering the development of the cease-fire 
[at the time that] the Three-State Commission visited Medan in Septem­
ber 1947.6 6 Swinton gave the writer a copy of a cable he was about to 
send from Medan to New York, and gave permission to print it in the 
newspaper Waspada which the writer ran at that time. In this report 
he stated quite categorically that on the eve of the Allied landings 
the BHL had been formed by Captain Inouye, its troops consisting of 
well-trained Indonesian pemuda, with the aim of slowing down and ob­
structing the Allied landings. In his report Swinton stated that he 
had obtained his information from a Major-General in the TNI (Army),67 
who told him that the BHL also opposed the Republic and so had to be 
dealt with. Its initial strength was 2,000 fully armed men, and it 
had detained 3,000 people, all in all, including 500 Chinese (Tionghoa).
With regard to the jewels in Saleh Umar’s hands, so far as the 
writer could discover from Saleh’s own comments and from the informa­
tion that went around, it is clear that when, at the beginning of 1950, 
Saleh Umar was given the opportunity by Kawilarang to bring th< :n to
64. For details on the politics of this issue, see ibid., pp. 298, 301 and 411.
65. Col. Maludin Simbolon was Panglima (Military Commander) of TT/I (North and Cen­
tral Sumatra) from April 1950 to December 1956.
66. The Three-State Commission (Belgium, Australi. and the United States), often 
referred to as the Committee of Good Offices, was set up by the U.N. Security 
Council in August 1947 following the first Dutch military action against the 
Republic.
67. In 1947, the name of the Republican Army was changed from TRI to TNI (Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia--Indonesian National Army).
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Medan before going to prison, all were surrendered to the Panglima 
with a full inventory and signed receipt.68 The whole question was 
tied in with the role of A. E. Saragih Ras, as will be described below.
With respect to the notable Selamat Ginting, the issue was quite 
separate.69 It seems that when the Round Table Conference Agreement 
was accepted, he did not believe in the good faith of the Dutch. Be­
fore going back into the city [Medan], Selamat ordered his men to bury 
all their weapons. He calculated that if the Dutch launched a third 
attack, it would not be difficult to reactivate the resistance. He 
was arrested at Simbolonfs orders, and after a long period in prison, 
was brought up for trial. Evidently the judge understood that he had 
had no evil intentions towards the Republic and the government, but 
still he was sentenced, though only for the duration of his pre-trial 
detention.
The writer felt that his party’s mission to win the release of 
the PNI’s prime leaders was done, when suddenly he received a further 
letter from still another PNI leader. This was A. E. Saragih Ras, 
active commander of the Barisan Harimau Liar himself, who wrote to ask 
the writer’s help to get released from prison. It seemed that he had 
been held for more than a year, since being surrounded in Simelungun 
by Mobrig, who had been hunting him down for a long time.70
When the writer went to visit him in the jail at Pematang Siantar, 
he found himself face to face with an extremely emaciated and exhausted 
man (whose physical and mental condition had deteriorated badly). The 
writer could not stop wondering how such a man could control and keep 
tight discipline over a large force of pemuda, forming a much feared 
unit.
Saragih Ras had not had an easy youth, by any means. The writer 
got this impression from the written autobiography Ras gave him. He 
began to make his own living when he was sixteen as the driver of an 
ox-cart. In 1922 he became a leerlingssehrijver (apprentice clerk) in 
the office of the Panei administration (Simelungun). He resigned in 
1923, joined a gang of smugglers, and became a gambler as well. In 
1924-1925 he studied magic with the Persatuan Pentjak Natal [Natal 
Pentjak Association]. In 1926 he worked in a garage and succeeded in 
getting a driver’s license. From 1927 to 1930 he was a taxidriver. 
From 1931 to 1941 he was acting chief of Kampung Saragih Ras and a 
member of the Kerapatan (Adat) Court for twelve years--as well as
68. Col. Alex Kawilarang was Panglima of TT/I from December 27, 1949 (the transfer 
of sovereignty) till April 19, 1950, when he was relieved by Simbolon.
69. Selamat Ginting was born in 1923 in Kuta Bangun, Tanah Karo. He made his repu­
tation as a pemuda military leader during the revolution--!irst as commander of 
the Lasjkar Rakjat irregulars ±n Medan and Tanah Karo; then as commander of 
Napindo (Nasional Pelopor Indonesia--Indonesian National Vanguard) for North 
Sumatra--concurrently Napindo field commander in the Medan area and leader of 
the Napindo Halilintar (Lightning) Regiment; finally as commander of Sector 
III/VII and acting military governor of Dairi. He resigned from the military 
after the transfer of sovereignty over the demobilization issue, and became an 
important PNI leader in the Karo region.
70. Mobrig--Mobil Brigade--the crack motorized force of the Indonesian police 
(later known as Brimob).
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being clerk of the collection office in Tiga Ras and a contractor for 
the plantations. In 1938 he became a member of the Pematang Siantar 
branch of Gerindo and founded the Tiga Ras sub-branch. In 1942 he 
actively welcomed the Japanese. In 1943 he ran the Tiga Ras trading 
cooperative in agricultural products and was head of the local Peasant 
League (Sarekat Tani). In 1944 he became a member of the Kenkoku 
Teisintai (Barisan Harimau Liar) formed by Inouye, and in 1945 led the 
Barisan Harimau Liar formed from former KT elements.
Saragih Ras stated that his forces had at one time attained a 
strength of twelve battalions. As a disciplined commander, Saragih 
Ras was in turn fully obedient to his superiors, i.e., the duumvirate 
Saleh Umar— Jakub Siregar. Given this complete obedience, it was not 
surprising that the Sumatra Commander, Major-General Suhardjo, once 
assigned Jakub Siregar to form, along with five other leaders (Lt. Col 
Kartawinata, Bustami, Amir Jusuf, Selamat Ginting and Bedjo), a TNI 
strike-force consisting of picked pemuda, a fact which gives one the 
impression that the Barisan Harimau Liar itself was expected to be the 
core of this new force.71
The further details of Ras' s life were quite lengthy and are not 
relevant to this article except for his story or confession about the 
history of the feudal treasures (including cut and uncut diamonds) 
which at one point were in his hands. He explained this to the writer 
along the lines of what he had told the High Military Prosecutor and 
the Deputy Prosecutor-General from Djakarta when he was interrogated.
Saragih Ras stated that about eight days before the "social revo­
lution" broke out, he received secret instructions from the Supreme 
Headquarters leaders in Medan who came specially to Siantar for the 
purpose. The meeting was held in the former Simelungun Club building. 
Saragih Ras stated that the visitors from the Supreme Headquarters Command 
consisted of Sarwono, its general chairman, and Zainal Baharuddin, its 
secretary. On that occasion Sarwono stressed that it was now quite 
clear that the rulers and their henchmen were an obstruction to inde­
pendence. Therefore, said Sarwono, a revolution would have to be car­
ried out to crush them and their major henchmen. A lengthy discussion 
then followed and finally Saragih Ras steeled himself to undertake the 
mission to carry out the "revolution," a mission he received via the 
top leadership of the Barisan Harimau Liar, i.e., Saleh Umar himself. 
The same mission was assigned by Sarwono directly to a certain Aziz 
Siregar, a Pesindo leader in Simelungun. The execution of the mission 
said Saragih, was done starting at 00 hours March 3-4, with the under­
standing that action be taken in each kampung by the local kampung men 
themselves. Further, Saragih accompanied Saleh Umar on a tour round 
other kampung in Simelungun to assign similar tasks in the relevant 
places. In Tanah Djawa, said Saragih, the task was assigned to Bagus 
Saragih, the head of the PKI in Tanah Djawa.
Saragih Ras related that the missions were carried out success­
fully, but that on that occasion no seizure of jewels was made. None­
theless, it later turned out that some jewels did come into his hands. 
In this regard he stated that in 1949 he turned all this property over
71. Major-General R. Suhardjo Hardjowardojo had been appointed the top Army com­
mander for all of Sumatra in June 1946. (He had been police chief in Lampung 
before that.) He was recalled to Jogjakarta only on the eve of the second 
Dutch military attack.
185
to Saleh Umar in his then capacity as Vice-Resident of East Sumatra, 
via the Commission which they had set up. This was done so that all 
the property might be officially transferred and received in the pub­
lic view. He added that on two occasions part of the jewels had been 
used. First, to buy supplies in Sidikalang with a receipt from the 
above-mentioned Commission. Second, when they were in Pasar Matonggar, 
South Tapanuli, in order to buy weapons in Singapore. Again a receipt 
existed as evidence; the man who arranged the purchase was Saleh Umar, 
and he in turn assigned a Chinese called Oei Boen Tjoan to carry it 
out,
So much for a small fragment of the quite lengthy narrative/con- 
fession of Saragih Ras. From this narrative/confession of his it 
turns out that the ’’social revolution” was a secret project of the 
Supreme Headquarters and that the leadership of the Supreme Headquar­
ters was Sarwono and Zainal Baharuddin, with Saleh Umar as an asso­
ciate. What the status of the Supreme Headquarters was vis-a-vis the 
Volksfront, and whether it in effect was the military section of that 
joint body, is not clear.
Likewise, Saleh Umar himself, as a matter of fact, gave an ac­
counting for the feudal treasure that he said was once in his hands. 
Some years later, after the whole business seemed to have been gedeipo- 
neerdy Assistant Prosecutor-General Muthalib Moro came to Medan to re­
turn the treasure which had been handed in to the aristocrats who 
claimed to be the owners. The transfer was carried out in a room at 
the Prosecutor’s Office in Medan, and the ceremony was made open to 
journalists as witnesses.
So far as could be seen, the affair seemed closed, although in 
actual fact a great deal of the feudal treasure had disappeared to who 
knows where. Even though some people must have known, evidently they 
were keeping it quiet. Up till now, there seems to have been no more 
attention paid to that part of the treasure which was not in Saleh 
Umar’s hands.
Just for the record: not long after the first Dutch aggression,
Pematang Siantar was occupied by Dutch troops, and so the capital of 
Sumatra had to be moved to Bukittinggi. Among those who moved with it 
were seconded Resident Abdul Karim Ms. and other intimate Karimists 
such as S. M. Tarigan, Sarwono, Mr. Luat Siregar and of course Jahja 
Jakub, who continued actively running the All-Sumatra Office of Infor­
mation (under the Governor), though there was a Ministry of Information 
representation for Sumatra as well under the leadership of Adinegoro.
At the time of the election of the KNIP [Central Indonesian 
National Committee] prior to the second Dutch aggression, as a result 
of Karim’s efforts, Mr. Luat Siregar was chosen, and he also became a 
member of its Working Committee. So too was Zainal Baharuddin. Sar­
wono followed later--with the result that those leaders who evidently 
knew most about the ins and outs of the ’’social revolution” were now 
in Java. Junus Nasution, whom we last saw in Raja, popped up in Man- 
dailing shortly after the first [Dutch] aggression, and from then on 
was active in South Tapanuli only. He knew nothing of what had hap­
pened to the feudal treasure.
Thus, if the development of the ’’social revolution” is to be 
organized into a coherent body of notes and commentary from A to Z, 
much more time and cautious patience will be required. For aside from
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developments within Republican territory, there was also an important 
court case during the Dutch occupation period. Information from that 
source could in some way be compared with developments elsewhere, so 
that the data and facts could be properly fitted together and organ­
ized, even though as things stand now the whole affair seems to be a 
long chapter without a conclusion. Finis!!!!
